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Volume 3.1
Can Machines Commit Crimes Under U.S. Antitrust Laws?
Aslihan Asil
Yale University, PhD in Financial Economics 2024, Yale Law School, J.D. 2021

This paper benefitted from discussions with Ian Ayres, Matt Backus, Joe Harrington, Alex MacKay, Fiona Scott Morton, and Paulo Ramos. All errors are the authors’ own. Wollmann thanks the William Ladany Research Fund at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business for its generous support. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.

Thomas G. Wollmann
Associate Professor of Economics and William Ladany Faculty Scholar, University of Chicago Booth School of Business, Faculty Research Fellow, National Bureau of Economic Research

This paper benefitted from discussions with Ian Ayres, Matt Backus, Joe Harrington, Alex MacKay, Fiona Scott Morton, and Paulo Ramos. All errors are the authors’ own. Wollmann thanks the William Ladany Research Fund at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business for its generous support. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.

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Volume 3.1
“Killer Acquisitions” Reexamined: Economic Hyperbole in the Age of Populist Antitrust
Jonathan M. Barnett
Torrey H. Webb Professor of Law, Gould School of Law, University of Southern California

I am grateful for comments from Or Brook, Harold Furchgott-Roth, Bo Heiden, Nicolas Petit, Daniel Sokol, David Teece, Selcukhan Unekbas, Matthew Wansley, John Yun, and participants at the European University Institute Competition Law Working Group, the University of Southern California Gould School of Law Faculty Workshop, and the Yale Law School-Hebrew University Law & Economics Conference. This project has been supported by the Berkeley Research Group Institute. Comments are welcome at jbarnett@law.usc.edu.

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Volume 3.1
Corporate Governance and Risk-taking: A Statistical Approach
Steven L. Schwarcz
Stanley A. Star Distinguished Professor of Law & Business, Duke University School of Law; Senior Fellow, the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI); Founding Director, Duke Global Financial Markets Center

The author thanks Stephen M. Bainbridge, Christopher Buccafusco, Elisabeth de Fontenay, John de Figueiredo, Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Lorilee A. Medders and participants in a faculty workshop at Duke University School of Law for valuable comments and Justin Reed and Josh Rudd for invaluable research assistance.

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Volume 3.1
The Ascertainable Standards that Define the Boundaries of the SEC’s Rulemaking Authority
Bernard S. Sharfman
Senior Corporate Governance Fellow at the RealClearFoundation; Research Fellow at the Law & Economics Center at George Mason University’s Antonin Scalia Law School; and member of the Journal of Corporation Law’s editorial advisory board

The opinions expressed here are the author’s alone and do not represent the official position of any organization with which he is currently affiliated. Moreover, this Article was not funded by any of the organizations that Mr. Sharfman is affiliated with. Mr. Sharfman would like to thank Amanda Rose, Lawrence A. Cunningham, Bryce Tingle, Alex Platt, and George S. Georgiev for their helpful comments. Mr. Sharfman is dedicating this Article to his wife, Susan Thea David, daughter, Amy David Beltchatovski, son-in-law, Elliot Beltchatovski, and granddaughter, Ava Beltchatovski. The catalyst for this writing was the short discussion of “in the public interest” found in Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule’s book, Law & Leviathan: Redeeming the Administrative State 119-122 (2020).

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Volume 2.2
Proceduralism: Delaware’s Legacy
Dalia T. Mitchell
Professor of Law and John Marshall Harlan Dean’s Research Professor of Law, The George Washington University

For their comments on earlier drafts, I am grateful to Harut Minasian, Esq., to participants in a faculty workshop at Rutgers Law School, and to the students in my Fall 2022 Corporations Law seminar. The George Washington University Summer Research Fund provided financial support. All errors are mine.

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Volume 2.2
The Chinese Antitrust Paradox
Wentong Zheng
Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law

I thank Donald Clarke, Mary Gallagher, Nicholas Howson, Benjamin Lieberman, Julia Ya Qin, Angela Huyue Zhang, and participants in the “China’s Legal Construction Program at 40 Years: Towards an Autonomous Legal System?” conference at the University of Michigan Law School for helpful comments on an earlier draft of the article.

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Volume 2.2
How to Fix DOJ Privilege Teams
Anna Dincher
J.D. Candidate 2024, University of Chicago Law School

Many thanks to Professor Anthony Casey for his thoughtful insights and charitable guidance. Thank you to the University of Chicago Business Law Review editorial staff, and special thanks to J.P. Callahan for incredibly helpful feedback.

I. Introduction

Privilege teams, also known as “taint teams” or “filter teams,”1

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Volume 2.2
Workers of the World, Differentiate: Expanding Protections for Workers in the Age of Labor Antitrust
Sarah Hammond Roberts
B.A. 2020, The University of California, Berkeley; J.D. Candidate 2024, The University of Chicago Law School

Many thanks to the entire University of Chicago Business Law Review, especially Spencer Parts, and to Professor Randal Picker for help and comments. I would like to especially thank Professor Eric Posner for his thoughtful suggestions regarding this Comment, and his guidance in thinking about labor antitrust.