Behavioral Antitrust Realism: Remedies and Institutional Design in United States v. Google

I. Introduction

In United States v. Google LLC,1 Judge Amit Mehta issued arguably the most consequential Section 2 remedies order since United States v. Microsoft Corp.,2 over two decades earlier. The Department of Justice alleged—and the court agreed—that Google’s distribution agreements with browser developers and original equipment manufacturers entrenched its monopoly in general search and search-text advertising.3 The court found that the agreements “froze the search ecosystem, resulting in markets in which Google has no true competitor.”4 The court’s initial opinion stated succinctly, “Google is a monopolist, and it has acted as one to maintain its monopoly. It has violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act.”5 After finding liability, Judge Mehta declined to order structural divestiture, instead imposing broad behavioral obligations.6

For more than a century, American antitrust enforcement has oscillated between structuralism, the dissolution of firms to restore competition, and supervision, the ongoing judicial or regulatory oversight of corporate behavior. Earlier cases encapsulated the traditional model, which sought to break up monopolists in order to “pry open to competition a market that has been closed by defendants' illegal restraints.”7 However, the advent of the ‘Big Tech’ industry has significantly convoluted the actual benefits that forced divestitures would bring, so courts have become increasingly skeptical of breakups.8 

This article argues that Judge Mehta’s decision in Google refocuses behavioral decrees from a second-best alternative into the preferred tool of market correction. As a result, Google solidifies a new era of “behavioral antitrust realism,” a remedial paradigm which preserves competition through behavioral supervision rather than a structuralist approach. While pragmatically attractive, this model recasts the institutional role of courts: judges become quasi-regulators responsible for continuous monitoring of compliance and competitive effects. This article therefore discusses the benefits and potential drawbacks of such a regime.

The analysis proceeds in three parts. Part A traces the evolution of antitrust remedies from the structural dissolutions of the early twentieth century to the behavioral supervision that have become increasingly more comment over recent decades. Part B examines Judge Mehta’s decree, focusing first on his decision to decline a structural remedy before distilling the behavioral remedies he both accepted and declined. Part C evaluates the institutional implications of this remedial turn.

II. Analysis

A. From Structuralism to Supervision: The Evolution of Antitrust Remedies

Antitrust remedies under Section 2 are generally designed to “terminate the defendant's unlawful conduct, prevent its recurrence, and re-establish the opportunity for competition in the affected market.”9 To accomplish these goals, the government may seek any of several available remedies, including “both conduct and structural remedies,” depending on their apparent “effects on efficiency and innovation as well as different administrative costs.”10 Historically, the prevailing judicial philosophy viewed dissolution or divestiture as the natural corollary of a Sherman Act violation. The landmark case of Standard Oil. Co. v. United States put it like this: “The remedy to be administered in case of a combination violating the Anti-trust Act is two-fold: first, to forbid the continuance of the prohibited act, and second, to so dissolve the combination as to neutralize the force of the unlawful power.”11 Competition, courts felt, could not flourish so long as a dominant entity retained integrated control over production, distribution, and pricing. Similar reasoning underpinned Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States where the Court ordered dissolution into sixteen independently owned firms.12

While several remedies were handed down during this time which did not call for dissolution, structuralism remained common throughout the mid-twentieth century. Courts and enforcers understood antitrust relief not simply as punishment but as a way to restructure markets according to competitive norms. However, confidence in structural relief began to wane as the years progressed. Firms and markets became more complex, and courts started questioning whether such markets could be meaningfully restored through divestiture without producing inefficiency or stifling innovation. The breakup of AT&T in 1982 illustrates this shifting sentiment.13 The District Court for the District of Columbia approved a consent decree which required the divestiture of AT&T’s local telephone operating companies, prohibited AT&T from entering the electronic publishing market for seven years, and mandated judicial oversight of the reorganization plan.14 This was a hybrid remedy which was aimed less at dismantling the firm physically and more at the policing of market behavior. While still utilizing a traditional divestiture, the court recognized that certain aspects of competition would be best promoted by regulation and judicial oversight

This shift in judicial philosophy became even more explicit in Microsoft, where the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia vacated the district court’s breakup order and remanded for consideration of narrower behavioral measures.15 The court stated that, “divestiture is a remedy that is imposed only with great caution, in part because its long-term efficacy is rarely certain.”16 In the years following Microsoft, both the agencies and courts began to explicitly favor behavioral remedies, with the DOJ’s 2009 report noting that structural remedies “are less favored in section 2 cases . . . [because] the advantages typically associated with structural relief in merger cases may not exist.”17 Skepticism towards divestiture set the stage for the behavioral turn that culminated in Google, shifting judicial focus from breaking firms apart to monitoring the ongoing terms of their market participation. Judge Mehta’s order epitomizes this evolution. Rather than restructuring Google, the court imposed an intricate web of behavioral obligations designed to maintain competitive conditions within Google’s existing architecture.18

B. The Anatomy of the Google Decree, In Context

The remedies phase of United States v. Google LLC represents the most ambitious judicial intervention in a digital platform since Microsoft. As noted, Judge Mehta declined to order divestiture, designing a layered remedy aimed at restoring competition while maintaining the functional integrity of Google’s ecosystem. 

Yet the Google order does not stand in complete isolation. Rather, it bolsters the modern line of Section 2 cases in which courts have declined to impose structural divestiture in technologically complex markets and have instead turned toward behavioral supervision. Beginning with Microsoft, where the D.C. Circuit vacated a breakup order and emphasized that divestiture must be imposed “only with great caution,” courts have expressed skepticism that forced restructuring is either administrable or well-tailored to the competitive wrongs identified.19 Judge Mehta’s initial decree, discussed further below, thus reflects this same remedial logic: where monopoly power is maintained through contracts, defaults, and scale advantages rather than unlawful structure, the appropriate response is not dissolution but an intricate system of conduct-based obligations. 

Importantly, after issuing its initial decision, the court then directed the parties to meet and present a joint proposed final judgment. Naturally, the parties “submitted two competing final proposed final judgments reflecting their respective interpretations of the Remedies Opinion” which the court modified as it saw fit.20 This decision (the “Final Remedies Opinion”) is referenced when necessary to further explain how the court’s refinement of its proposed remedies crystallize the transition to a behavioral-conduct remedial system. Indeed, “it is well settled that once the Government has successfully borne the considerable burden of establishing a violation of [antitrust] law, all doubts as to the remedy are to be resolved in its favor.”21

1. Structural Remedies

The court began by addressing “perhaps the most controversial” proposed remedy, wherein the government asked that Google immediately divest Chrome.22 Chrome, the Court explained, is a default browser that accounts for 20% of all searches in the country. Due to this positioning, “the Chrome divestiture proposed by Plaintiffs is less radical than the break-up proposed in [Microsoft]” because, in the short term, Google would not be dislodged from its “market primacy.”23 But Judge Mehta did not order such a divesture. Echoing the cautionary language of Microsoft, the court reiterated the perspective that “such relief should be ordered only after determining that less severe remedies likely would prove inadequate,” a burden which the government did not meet.24 

The court further explained the D.C. Circuit’s “clearer indication of a significant causal connection” test, which asks the court “to discern between conduct that maintains a monopoly through anticompetitive acts as distinct from ‘growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.’”25 Here, a divesture of Google did not follow from this test as “the record also contain[ed] ample evidence that lawful conduct played an important role in Google's maintenance of its monopoly.”26 Judge Mehta also declined to order a divestiture of Android for similar reasons.27

This reluctance to impose structural relief is consistent not only with Microsoft but with more recent judicial treatment of technology firms. In many cases, structural remedies aren’t even proposed due to the inherent difficulties with justifying them in the context of such firms.28

2. Behavioral Remedies

Having set structural relief aside, the court shifted to the government’s proposed measures of behavioral remedy. As in Microsoft—where the D.C. Circuit remanded for consideration of narrower conduct-based relief—the Google decree focuses on unwinding contractual mechanisms and defaults rather than restructuring the firm itself. 

Judge Mehta ultimately declined to adopt a payment ban and several data-sharing proposals. In doing so, the court repeatedly emphasized the risk of harm to OEMs, carriers, browser developers, and consumer welfare, concluding that certain proposals were “too broad,”29 posed a “substantial risk of harm,”30 or were not “tailored to fit the wrong creating the occasion for the remedy.”31 This emphasis on tailoring parallels the reasoning in Verizon Communs., Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004), where the Court said that “[e]nforced sharing also requires antitrust courts to act as central planners . . . a role for which they are illsuited.”32 Indeed, courts are often cautious of “impos[ing] a duty . . . that it cannot explain or adequately and reasonably supervise,” especially where data is concerned.33

The court did approve narrower, one-time versions of several data-sharing and syndication obligations on Google, as “[m]aking data available to competitors would narrow the scale gap created by Google's exclusive distribution agreements and, in turn, the quality gap that followed.”34 In the Final Remedies Opinion, the court approved data sharing subject to a license “that prohibits them from sharing or selling the data received,” designed to do nothing more than “ensure that execution of this remedy remains moored to its purpose.”35 

The court also approved limited syndication remedies, requiring Google to offer organic web search results and search-text-ad syndication to qualified competitors on non-discriminatory, market-rate terms, subject to ordinary contractual restrictions.36 Though there was significant disagreement among the parties, the court’s Final Remedies Opinion adopts a five-year license and approve Plaintiff’s proposed language in all but the sub-syndication provision, which it struck.37 

Next, the approved limited disclosure of Search Index components and certain user-side data,38 while rejecting proposals related to the Knowledge Graph39 and Ads Data40 as lacking fit or proof. By contrast, the court declined to require choice screens, citing product redesign concerns, lawful self-preferencing, and evidence that such screens were unlikely to affect the competitive landscape.41

3. Administrative and Supervisory Measures

Finally, the court established a Technical Committee to facilitate enforcement and compliance, while rejecting sweeping anti-retaliation, anti-circumvention, transaction-notification, and self-preferencing restrictions on legal and evidentiary grounds.42 In its Final Remedies Opinion, the court discusses the “contentious” Technical Committee provisions at length, calling it “the ‘enforcement arm of the government.’”43 Though it expressed concern at “being called in as a referee to the minutiae of the Final Judgment's execution and enforcement,” it ultimately allowed Google an express right of objection to any of the Committee’s decisions while affording deference to Plaintiff’s provisions in this section.44 As in Microsoft, the decree preserves continuing jurisdiction and relies on supervision of conduct rather than dissolution of the firm. 

4. Generative AI as a Forward-Looking Justification for Behavioral Remedies

The court’s final remedies decision makes explicit what was only implicit at earlier stages of the litigation: that remedies in monopolization cases must be calibrated not only to past foreclosure, but to predictable paths by which monopoly power may be extended into adjacent and emerging markets. The court’s treatment of generative artificial intelligence (“GenAI”) is best understood in this light. The court did not define an AI market or discuss monopoly power specifically in the AI context, in large part because “GenAI burst on to the scene as a formidable nascent threat to general search engines” between the liability and remedies phases of the proceedings.45 As a result, the remedies phase became “as much about promoting competition among GSEs as ensuring that Google's dominance in search does not carry over into the GenAI space.”46 Crucially, the court “rejected Google's insistence that GenAI products [ ] be excluded because they were outside the relevant markets or untethered to Plaintiffs' theory of liability.”47 This framing confirms that the court viewed AI not as a new violation, but as a foreseeable domain in which the effects of the adjudicated violation could manifest absent effective relief. 

The court’s treatment of GenAI also reinforces its emphasis on behavioral remedies over structural relief. The competitive risk identified by the court is not rooted in Google’s ownership of AI per se but in its ability to leverage existing advantages—distribution, defaults, scale, and data—into such emergent technologies. The court put this concern rather bluntly: “Google cannot be permitted to leverage its dominance in general search to the GenAI product space.”48 In its Final Remedies Order, the court permitted remedial provisions to apply to Google’s GenAI products only on a “parallel” basis with existing obligations governing non-GenAI products, thereby ensuring that AI did not become a vehicle for imposing distinct or more expansive remedial duties untethered from the adjudicated search violation.49 Because GenAI is a nascent market,50 one-time relief is necessarily incomplete. The court’s reliance on technical oversight mechanisms reflects an institutional judgment that supervision, rather than prediction, is the appropriate judicial response to technological uncertainty. It’s willingness to account for GenAI at the remedies stage underscores why behavioral relief has become central to modern antitrust doctrine. In technology markets, the task of antitrust remedies includes ensuring that dominant firms cannot use closed markets as launchpads into the next generation of competition.

C. Behavioral Antitrust Realism and Its Institutional Consequences

The remedial posture that emerges from Google reflects an increasingly common skepticism that structural remedies are neither feasible nor well-aligned with the wrongs at issue in digital search markets.51 This skepticism is both practical and doctrinal. A Section 2 remedy must ‘fit the wrong,’ and Judge Mehta framed Google’s monopoly not as a structural consequence of integration but as a contractual and defaults-driven form of exclusion. That mode of liability naturally points toward remedies designed to unwind, supervise, or police those contractual arrangements. That is, the appropriate ‘fit’ requires ongoing supervision of contracts and data flows as opposed to a forced breakup of a lawfully created monopoly. 

Consequently, the decision marks a decisive institutional turn away from structural separation towards what this Article terms “behavioral antitrust realism,” a remedial philosophy defined by (1) tailoring remedies to conduct rather than structure, (2) relying on iterative judicial or quasi-judicial oversight, and (3) accepting that competitive conditions in digital markets depend on monitoring defaults and contractual incentives. This shift has significant institutional implications for courts, agencies, and regulated firms. This Part evaluates those implications and argues that Google crystallizes a trend long discussed in scholarly and policy literature: modern digital markets may require durable, supervisory remedies rather than one-time structural interventions.52 Such a regime naturally carries with it substantial benefits and risks. 

1. Institutional Advantages of Behavioral Supervision

It is clear that behavioral remedies often offer superior fit between the alleged conduct and the remedy imposed. Monopolies like Google’s often form as a result of lawful conduct and competitive advantages. It is only when the company engages in exclusionary conduct which serves to maintain said monopoly that liability is found. As a result of both legal and illegal actions, Google was able to build an “unparalleled volume of scale,” which enabled it to develop complex synergies that ultimately benefit the consumer.53 A structural breakup of such a platform risks disrupting synergies entirely separate from the unlawful behavior, whereas tailored behavioral terms directly target the exclusionary mechanisms identified by the court. Indeed, “[b]reaking up large firms that benefit from extensive economies of scale and scope will injure consumers.”54 Instead, we want “remedies in high-tech markets . . . to provide opportunities for competition on the merits, while still enabling even a dominant firm to improve its products or services.”55 

Judge Mehta expressed concern about harming consumer welfare in declining to adopt certain remedies, including a divesture of Chrome.56 Due to Google’s complicated infrastructure, personnel, and APIs, “the court [was] highly skeptical that a Chrome divestiture would not come at the expense of substantial product degradation and a loss of consumer welfare.”57 In accepting certain remedies, the court focused on directly unwinding contractual mechanisms rather than opting to restructure Google. For example, provisions requiring data-sharing, limits on search-text-ad syndication, and prohibitions on certain default-setting contracts are all specifically targeted at unlawful conduct but allow Google to continue to innovate and capture the market lawfully.58

In addition to illustrating the court’s concern about consumer welfare, this framework allows remedies to be implemented and adapt more easily. Technology markets evolve rapidly, and a one-time structural rewrite might become obsolete before the litigation even ends. This is exacerbated by the fact that the losing litigant is very likely to appeal a breakup order, which would delay its effect even further. Alternatively, a behavioral remedy can take effect much more quickly.59 Behavioral conditions can also be revised, extended, narrowed, or removed in light of changing technologies. Judge Mehta acknowledged this dynamism by retaining continuing jurisdiction and establishing a Technical Committee,60 a feature that mirrors but significantly expands upon the supervisory mechanisms used in Microsoft.61

It can even be argued that behavioral remedies are more administrable than structural breakups, at lease insofar as “structural remedies are more difficult to design” due to the complex nature of firms like Google.62 Behavioral remedies fit more comfortably within the judiciary’s institutional capacity, as monitoring contracting is in some ways institutionally easier than untangling integrated firms. Because courts routinely interpret and supervise compliance with equitable decrees, the mechanics of behavioral oversight draw on familiar judicial competencies rather than the extraordinary task of redrawing a firm’s architecture.

2. Institutional Risks of Behavioral Realism

Despite these advantages, a behavioral supervision regime places substantial institutional stress on courts and agencies. Most obviously, behavioral remedies require ongoing monitoring, “an onerous and resource-intensive process, especially in digital markets.”63 This risks transforming courts from adjudicators into regulators, an institutional role for which they are not designed. 

The Google decree is replete with provisions that require continuous interpretation. The court implementing this remedy must review future default-placement agreements and contract structures. What begins as an equitable response to proven monopolizing conduct thus becomes an open-ended supervisory project requiring continuous intervention in Google’s contractual ecosystem and product-design choices.

A further concern of behavioral realism is the significant risk of institutional drift.64 Behavioral conditions in digital markets rarely operate as short-lived injunctions; they tend instead to evolve into ongoing governance regimes that require continuous revision as technology changes.65 For example, default-placement restrictions may need updating as new Google products, such as AI assistants integrated into Android or Chrome, reshape the search interface. In short, when liability and remedy both center on contractual and design-level conduct, enforcement necessarily becomes a continuous supervisory project rather than a discrete legal judgment. 

III. Conclusion

In finding that Google’s monopoly was maintained primarily through contractual defaults, scale advantages, and payments that entrenched its position, Judge Mehta declined to order structural remedies in favor of a layered system of behavioral obligations. The decision marks a pivotal moment in antitrust law, crystallizing the shift from structural to behavioral remedies in the tech space.

To be sure, such a system carries with it several advantages. Behavioral terms can be tailored to the specific exclusionary conduct identified at trial, avoid unnecessary disruption to integrated services, and adapt as the technology evolves. These features are essential if we are to properly regulate complicated markets, but they also impose long-term governance responsibilities on courts and agencies, requiring interpretation and monitoring as platforms modify their contracts and technology. Many of the remedies ordered by Judge Mehta exemplify this reality.

While not unique to Google, the case symbolizes the institutional danger inherent in this new remedial posture. By requiring courts and agencies to function as ongoing monitors, the remedy threatens to entangle the judiciary in precisely the sustained regulatory role that antitrust law has historically sought to avoid. The decision thus illustrates both the necessity and the limits of behavioral antitrust realism: necessary because structural options do not align with the identified wrong yet limited because supervision can drift beyond adjudication into governance.

• See generally 803 F. Supp. 3d 18, (D.D.C. Sep. 2, 2025).
• See generally 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
• Google, 803 F. Supp. 3d 18 at 36.
• Id. (quotations omitted).
• United States v. Google LLC, 747 F. Supp. 3d 1, 32 (D.D.C. 2024).
• See generally Google, 803 F. Supp. 3d 18; see also Bryan Koenig, Google Keeps Chrome, Payments, But Must Prop Up Rivals, Law360 (Sept. 2, 2025), available at https://plus.lexis.com/api/permalink/feee480b-5214-44a6-a638-015fef72e6c6/?context=1530671.
• Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 401 (1947).
• See, e.g.,Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (declining to break up Microsoft). Note that this case is often referred to as “Microsoft III.” This article will use “Microsoft” and “Microsoft III” interchangeably.
• U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Competition and Monopoly: Single-Firm Conduct Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, ch. 9 (2008), available at https://perma.cc/WGJ9-7FB3.
• Id.
• 221 U.S. 1, 30 (1911).
• 328 U.S. 781 (1946); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948) (compelling Hollywood studios to divest their theater chains).
• United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (1982).
• Id.
• United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
• Id. at 80.
• U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 9, ch. 9.
• See generally, United States v. Google LLC, 803 F. Supp. 3d 18, at 36 (D.D.C. Dec. 5, 2025).
• United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 80 (2001).
• Google, 803 F. Supp. 3d at 36.
• Final Remedies Opinion at *33 (D.D.C. Dec. 5, 2025) (quoting United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 334 (1961)).
• United States v. Google LLC, 803 F. Supp. 3d 18, 98 (D.D.C. Sep. 2, 2025).
• Id. at 98.
• Id. at 99.
• Id. at 100 (quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570―71 (1966)).
• Id. at 99.
• Id. at 101.
• See, e.g., Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 67 F.4th 946 (9th Cir. 2023), wherein no request for divestiture was submitted.
• Google, 803 F. Supp. 3dat 128 (discussing the government’s proposal to share ‘Ads Data’).
• Id. at 103 (rejecting the government’s proposed payment ban, which would have prohibited Google from making any revenue sharing or default/preferential placement inducing payments).
• Id. at 119 (quoting Microsoft III, 253 F.3d at 107) (rejecting the government’s proposal to require Google to share enough information to recreate its Knowledge Graph).
• Verizon Communs., Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004).
• Epic Games, 67 F.4th at 990 (quoting Trinko, 540 U.S. at 415).
• Google, 803 F. Supp. at 108.
• Final Remedies Opinion at *76, *81 (D.D.C. Dec. 5, 2025).
• Google, 803 F. Supp. at 130―40.
• Final Remedies Opinion, at *82―95 (D.D.C. Dec. 5, 2025).
• The Final Remedies Opinion adopts Google's “Web Search Index” rather than Plaintiffs’. Final Remedies Opinion at *73 n.9.
• Google, 803 F. Supp. 3dat 119 (describing the Knowledge Graph as a “database containing useful information about people, places, and things along with what connects them together . . . contain[ing] five billion entities and 500 billion connections among them”).
• Id. at 128 (“data related to Google's selection, ranking, and placement of Search Text Ads in response to queries.”).
• Id. at 142―44
• Id. at 152―58.
• Final Remedies Opinion, at *99 (quoting Microsoft IV, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 197).
• Final Remedies Opinion, at *100―03.
• Final Remedies Opinion at *35.
• Google, 803 F. Supp. 3d at 36.
• Final Remedies Opinion at *35
• Google, 803 F. Supp. 3d at *193.
• See id. at 95.
• The complexities of nascent markets are beyond the scope of this article. While the term is generally accepted to mean a new, emerging, or developing market in its early stages, in FTC v. Meta Platforms Inc., 654 F. Supp. 3d 892 (N.D. Cal. 2023), the Court noted that “neither party [ ] presented the Court with a working definition of "nascency," such that it can distinguish a nascent market from a more mature market. Id. at 924. 
  
• See, e.g., Daniel Sokol, Jeffrey Prince & Feng Zhu, Ensuring Antitrust Actually Promotes Competition in the Digital Economy: Evaluating Proposed Remedies in the Google Case 21―23 (USC CLASS Research Paper No. 2508, 2025) (arguing that “structural remedies can introduce unintended market inefficiencies and harm consumers” in the technology sector).
• See, e.g., Tom Wheeler, Phil Verveer & Gene Kimmelman, The Need for Regulation of Big Tech Beyond Antitrust, Brookings (Sep. 23, 2020), https://perma.cc/6TPN-88ZF (arguing for a purpose-built digital platform agency to provide ongoing oversight in the big tech industry).
• Google, 803 F. Supp. 3d at 36.
• Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and Platform Monopoly, 130 Yale L. J. 1952, 1952 (2021) (emphasis added).
• Samuel Miller, If Google Is A 'Bad' Monopoly, What Should Be Done?, Law360 (Oct. 22, 2013).
• Google, 803 F. Supp. 3d at 98.
• Id. at 101.
• See Id. at 111 (“Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Chipty, opined that the proposed data-sharing provisions would stimulate greater competition and thereby motivate Google to continue to innovate.”).
• David McCabe, The Fate of Google’s Ad Tech Monopoly Is Now in a Judge’s Hands, N.Y. Times (Nov. 21, 2025) (referring to remarks made by Judge Leonie M. Brinkema, who presided over the Google Ad Tech Trial, that a likely appeal by Google could further delay a sale of its assets while behavioral remedy could take effect quickly), https://www.nytimes.com/2025/11/21/technology/google-ad-tech-closing.html.
• SeeGoogle, 803 F. Supp. 3d at 153.
• STATE OF NEW YORK et al. v. MICROSOFT CORPORATION, Executive Summary (Nov. 1, 2002), https://perma.cc/9HGD-3C58 (“To ease the burden on the Court and on Microsoft in addressing Plaintiffs’ concerns, the Court will require Plaintiffs to form a committee to coordinate enforcement of the remedial decree.”).
• Friso Bostoen & David van Wamel, Antitrust Remedies: From Caution to Creativity, 14 J. Eur. Comp. L. & Prac. 540, 550 (Dec. 2023).
• Id. at 549.
• Institutional Drift, Economics Dictionary of Arguments, Dictionary of Arguments, Ed. Martin Schulz, Philosophy-Science-Humanities Controversies (last edited Nov. 2025) (defining institutional drift as “the gradual, unplanned, or unintended changes in the functioning, norms, or practices of institutions over time”).
• See Konrad Degen & Alexander Gleiss, Time to break up? The case for tailor‑made digital platform regulation based on platform‑governance standard type, 35 Electron. Markets 1 (Jan. 17, 2025) (arguing that, as platforms evolve through different governance “life-cycle phases,” regulatory remedies need to evolve too).