Shifting Winds: The Offshore Wind Industry in the Context of Administrative Volatility

I. Introduction

Offshore Wind Energy is an emerging industry in the United States and is currently “poised for exponential growth.”1 The Obama Administration undertook extensive efforts to accelerate wind and solar projects, such as approving 60 large-scale geothermal energy projects that could power five million homes,2 developing a competitive renewable energy leasing program on public lands, creating the “Smart from the Start” program for Offshore Wind leasing, and holding six of the first lease sales for Offshore Wind in the Atlantic Ocean.3 When Biden took office, his administration continued supporting the growth of the renewable energy industry. The Biden Administration set a goal to decarbonize the energy grid by 2025, but to reach this goal, the United States needed to “double or triple the level of renewable energy deployment and double the expansion of transmission.”4 As the industry continues to develop, industry experts predict that costs of development will reduce as a result of both scaling and learning effects.5 

Offshore Wind was key to reaching previous decarbonization goals of the Biden administration and the energy goals of several individual states.6 Unfortunately, Offshore Wind has become increasingly political, leading to project development setbacks. Following the aftermath of the Covid-19 Pandemic, despite the Trump Administration’s support for the fossil fuel industry, the administration abandoned stimulus for the Renewable Energy industry in the face of severe supply chain issues.7 Since President Trump took office in January of 2024, he has taken approximately two dozen actions against the Offshore Wind industry through various executive orders.8 The political volatility that comes with developing Offshore Wind has caused many industry leaders to question whether developers or suppliers want to risk investing in development in the United States.9

The project finance structure is a central reason why the Trump Administration’s hostility towards Offshore Wind has a severe impact. There are two major ways of financing Offshore Wind (sometimes used in combination): corporate financing and project financing. Under a corporate financing framework, projects are funded with capital investing, existing financing avenues, and liquidity management.10 Capital may be raised through loans, bonds, and share issues.11 Essentially, a developer uses their own assets, cash, and borrowing power to finance the project. However, a majority of new renewable-energy investment globally has utilized project-finance frameworks.12 In contrast to corporate financing, project financing requires that the project’s cash flow pays back the initial investment into the project, so project financing structures financing into stages of investment and repayment.13 This funding framework is viable for long term infrastructure projects but faces enormous challenges when it comes to regulatory uncertainty. Asim Haque, Senior Vice President at PJM Interconnected, emphasizes that “[h]aving a political system that changes day-to-day doesn’t allow you to develop and invest in something that takes a decade to build.”14

This article will focus on shifting regulatory and legal landscapes and how delays may create harsh obstacles in a multi-stage project financing framework.15 The article will begin by discussing the increasing politization of Offshore Wind as a background for the industry’s recent shifts in policy. Next, the article will discuss regulatory volatility, with a focus on the Trump Administration’s January 20th executive order and Section 232 tariff inquiry. Finally, the article will conclude by discussing potential legal avenues developers and states may take (and have already taken) in challenging administrative actions that are averse to Offshore Wind development.

II. Discussion

A. The Political Environment of Offshore Wind

Donald Trump has expressed a disdain for Offshore Wind development, pledging to “end” it on his first day in office.16 Moments before signing a new executive order to halt Offshore Wind Energy leasing, President Trump remarked, “[w]e aren’t going to do the wind thing.”17 In 2020, the Trump Administration delayed an environmental study that was crucial to permitting Vineyard Wind 1 due to “concerns that the project’s wind turbines [would] harm fisheries and navigation.”18

Anti-wind power advocates claim that Offshore Wind contributes to strandings or mortality of whales.19 However, these claims contradict findings from federal agencies. According to an independent study by the Society for Conservation Biology, there is “…no evidence that Offshore Wind development contributed to strandings or mortalities.”20 While Offshore Wind Energy construction may cause a noise disturbance for marine mammal species, “noise from site construction operation, and decommissioning, and shipping . . . contribute to additional sound in an already noisy and compromised marine environment.”21 The study drew from multiple datasets to examine spatial and temporal patterns in humpback whale strandings, mortalities, and serious injuries along the east coast from 1995 to 2022. Furthermore, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration concludes: 

“At this point, there is no scientific evidence that noise resulting from Offshore Wind site characterization surveys could potentially cause whale deaths. There are no known links between large whale deaths and ongoing Offshore Wind activities.”22 

B. Regulatory Whiplash

1. Administrative Actions

Federal permitting plays a significant role in Offshore Wind Energy project development. The Bureau of Ocean and Energy Management (BOEM) oversees the leasing, permitting, and environmental reviews of Offshore Wind projects. BOEM’s authorization process unfolds in four phases: planning, competitive leasing, site assessment, and review of a Construction and Operations Plan (COP).23 The outer continental shelf (OCS) has demonstrated great conditions for Offshore Wind development.24

On January 20, 2025, Trump issued an executive order titled: “Temporary Withdrawal of all Areas on the Outer Continental Shelf From Offshore Wind Leasing and Review of the Federal Government’s Leasing and Permitting Practices for Wind Projects” (Wind Directive).24 The Wind Directive orders federal officials to “conduct a comprehensive review of the ecological, economic and environmental necessity of terminating or amending any existing wind energy leases.”25  To prove his authority for the Wind Directive, President Trump cites Section 12 (a) of the OCSLA Act: 

“The President of the United States may, from time to time, withdraw from disposition any of the unleased lands of the outer Continental Shelf.”25

The second major administrative action against the Offshore Wind industry took the form of Secretary’s Order 3437: Ending Preferential Treatment for Unreliable, Foreign Controlled Energy Sources in Department Decision-Making (SO 3437).26 SO 3437 implements President Trump’s Wind Directive, directing the Department of Interior (DOI) to eliminate “preferential treatment” for wind and solar energy in comparison to fossil-fuel projects.27 In SO 3437, renewable energy is characterized as “unreliable,” “foreign controlled,” and “intermittent.”28 In addition to the politically charged language, the SO states that renewable energy undermines national security and grid reliability. The order instructs every Interior Bureau to review all regulations, permits, and financial authorizations for possible bias towards renewable energy and to recommend revisions within sixty days.29 

In the Summer of 2025, the Trump Administration began ramping up their administrative actions in opposition of Offshore Wind. In August, the DOI released Secretary Order 3438, which directed that National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) analyses for solar and wind projects should consider, “a reasonable range of alternatives that include projects with capacity densities meeting or exceeding that of the proposed project.”30 Next, the DOI began attempting to revoke permitting structures by attempting to cancel the approval of the Construction and Operations Plan (COP) that it granted to US Wind for its 2 GW Maryland Offshore Wind Project last year.31 After over four years of environmental and agency review, US wind received their federal permits.32 Around the same time as the permitting challenges, the DOI issued a Stop Work Order to Revolution Wind, a project on the east coast that is 80% complete, has installed all offshore foundations, and 45/65 wind turbines.33

These administrative policy decisions can delay and ultimately dismantle projects.26 The Wind Directive brough Offshore Wind companies’ project development to a standstill. The administration did not provide any deadlines for its review, placing lessees in a holding pattern where they were unable to continue substantive development until the review was completed.34 

Delays cost individual Offshore Wind companies billions of dollars, largely because most companies utilize a project finance framework.35 In 2023, Ørsted, a Danish Renewable Energy company, announced that it would lose approximately $2.12 billion because of delays caused by supply chain issues.36The company explained that “such delays could lead to extra costs and slower than anticipated receipts of revenues from the power generated by the turbines.”37 As supply chain issues and pandemic inflation intersected, PPA agreements between prominent Offshore Wind Developers and distribution companies became economically unviable.38 These financial woes contributed to the Commonwealth Wind Project to rebid and the Revolution Wind 2 Project to be cancelled.39 Notably, Morgan Lewis remarks, “[d]elayed or cancelled Offshore Wind projects may disrupt timelines, financing, and market positioning. Companies should prepare for heightened regulatory reviews and potential litigation.”40 

The Trump Administration’s recent approach has two central macroeconomic effects. First, the administration has chilled leasing processes for Offshore Wind with a series of administrative actions targeted directly at slowing or cancelling leasing processes. Second, Trump’s expressed opposition towards the industry may chill investment. Control Risk, a global risk and strategic consulting firm with expertise in in political risk assessments writes, “rapidly evolving regulations and the politicization of wind and solar projects mean that assessing political risks is becoming an increasingly important step in the investment decision making process.”41 Because the construction of an Offshore Wind farm is estimated to take between 7 and 11 years, it may be a risky investment for companies to take a chance on a project that may be met with political hostility and obstacles to development within its construction lifetime.42 Many industry leaders see present political volatility as long term instability. Timothy Fox, managing director at Clearview Energy Partners LLC writes, “Even if a future administration attempts to revive Offshore Wind development, developers and financiers are likely to be wary of investing in a sector with long lead times and such demonstrable election risks.”43 

2. Tariffs

In addition to legal actions and revocation of existing permits, the administration is poised to implement a 50% tariff on the Offshore Wind supply chain and has accelerated the end of federal tax credits for wind development as of January 19, 2026.44 In August, the Trump Administration opened a formal investigation under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion act of 1862 into the national security implications of imported wind turbines and parts.45 The Trade Expansion Act grants the president authority to restrict imports on national security grounds.46 Alison O’Leary of the Boston Globe writes, “[Section 232] has been used to justify tariffs on foundational industrial goods like steel and aluminum, not just from adversaries but from close allies, on the grounds that a decline in domestic production capacity could leave the U.S. vulnerable in a time of crisis.” 

The immediate implications of this tariff on the Offshore Wind industry would be twofold. First, by increasing the costs of inputs of Offshore Wind parts, Offshore Wind project costs will rise and deter investment as a result. A market report by BloombergNEF forecasts a 56 percent decrease in Offshore Wind development by 2035 compared to its prediction the previous year.47 The reduction is predicted to delay or cancel around $114 billion in Offshore Wind investments.48 Second, there is likely to be a significant disruption of the United States Offshore Wind supply chain. Kevin Beicke, Vice President of Morningstar DBRS, explains, “[In Europe] they have a supply chain fully built out, and with those economies of scale, the projects are less expensive to develop in Europe than they are in the U.S. to begin with.”49 If most major Offshore Wind companies are based abroad, political volatility combined with a nascent Offshore Wind supply chain may deter them from establishing business in the United States. 

III. Legal Remedies

A. Arbitrary and Capricious Review

If an action (1) concludes an agency’s decision-making process and (2) determines rights or obligations or imposes legal consequences, it is a “final action” under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).50 Even when an agency has indicated its intent to reconsider a temporary action, the rule may still be final if it “impose(s) substantial obligations on regulated parties for a considerable period of time.”51 Essentially, “as long as an agency has completed its decision making on a challenged rule—even one interim in nature—the rule satisfies the first prong of the finality test.”52

Under the APA, final agency actions are subject to review.53 A court must hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions that are found to be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.”54 A decision is arbitrary and capricious if an agency does not, “articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’”55 

This agency review can be a powerful tool for states and Offshore Wind developers in halting delays that financially cripple projects that are financed in multiple stages. In response to the administration’s Stop Work Order, Revolution Wind filed a lawsuit against the DOI claiming that the order was arbitrary and capricious.56 Following the lawsuit, a district court judge in D.C. granted the request for a preliminary injunction in late September.57

Other companies have followed by taking administrative legal action. On October 15, 2025, in response to the Trump Administration’s motion to stay the lawsuit, US Wind filed a motion for Preliminary Injunctive relief, asking the court to deny any action to halt the project before their individual lawsuit is resolved. In their motion, US Wind writes: “the government knows the approvals will easily withstand judicial review, and . . . its Revocation Decision will not.”58 Similarly, in a filed Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, The State of Rhode Island, State of Connecticut, and Katherine Dykes reason:

“Even assuming there were legitimate concerns about national security or interference, the Agency Defendants did not bother even trying to explain how those concerns justify indefinitely halting construction of a multi-billion dollar, fully permitted project.”59

The following sections will focus on the Administration’s Wind Directive and Tariff measures because they are (1) reviewable final agency actions, (2) supported by extensive administrative records, and (3) central to the industry’s investment climate. These examples illustrate destabilizing administrative action and how administrative law may operate as a check on that regulatory instability. While these remedies may not completely thwart administrative opposition to Offshore Wind, they can slow or reverse delays, which save developers billions of dollars. 

1. Agency Review and Presidential Wind Directive

Agency actions that are taken pursuant to directives in executive orders may be subject to judicial review under the APA.60 In Bennett v. Spear,  binding instructions and changed procedures likely constitute legal consequences.61 In the Wind Directive, the administration directs that administrative agencies, “shall not issue new or renewed approvals, rights of way, permits, leases, or loans for onshore or offshore-wind projects pending the completion of a comprehensive assessment and review of Federal wind leasing and permitting practices.” Effectively, the Wind Directive alters developers’ rights by delaying the permitting process indefinitely. In a complaint filed by eighteen states, plaintiffs write, 

“The Wind Directive has stopped most wind-energy development in its tracks, despite the fact that wind energy is a homegrown source of reliable affordable energy that supports hundreds of thousands of jobs, creates billions of dollars in economic activity and tax payments, and supplies more than 10% of the country’s electricity.”62

This section aims to outline key arguments injured parties may bring under administrative law. 

a. Lack of Reasoned Explanation

For judicial review to take place, an agency must “disclose the basis” of the action.63 State Farm holds:

“… an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.”64

To explain the Wind Directive’s indefinite and categorical pause on permitting approvals for Offshore Wind, the administration cited, “alleged legal deficiencies underlying the Federal Government’s leasing and permitting of onshore and Offshore Wind projects” and “potential inadequacies in various environmental reviews.”65 The Wind Directive employs conclusory language with a lack of warranting, as there is an absence of a detailed, evidence-based explanation or specific analysis to explain these conclusory statements. It would be against the legal rule in State Farm for courts to, “defer to [these] [. . .] conclusory or unsupported suppositions.”66 

b. Reliance Interests

There is a longstanding history of administrative rules that viewed Offshore Wind as essential to energy generation. As recently as 2024, the United States Department of Energy described wind energy as “a critical source of power generation, reliability, and decarbonization.67 The Wind Directive provides no substantive evidence for the extreme departure from this rule. 

Agencies have a higher standard for explanation when “[their] prior policy has engendered serious reliance interests that must be taken into account.”68 While an agency is not required to pursue a particular policy accommodation for reliance interests, it is required to assess the existence and strength of any reliance interests, and weigh them against the new policy.69 To ignore reliance interests constitutes arbitrary and capricious rulemaking.70

In Regents, the policy change in question was the 2017 decision to rescind the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program.71 Reliance interests cited in Regents included costs to employers totaling $6.3 billion for hiring replacements, the loss of $215 billion in economic activity, and an associated $60 billion in federal tax revenue.72 Moreover, respondents cited losses at the local and state levels reaching approximately $1.25 billion.73

Challengers to the Wind Directive can utilize the uniquely high financing figures to support the finding of reliance interests. Atin Jain, BNEF Wind Power specialist explains, “because [Offshore Wind is] more capital-intensive, there is a higher reliance on policy, and there is a greater site-specific resource dependency.”74 Moreover, major developers invest billions into Offshore Wind Projects and likely have robust statistical arguments for reliance. In 2021 alone, BOEM netted a record $4.37 billion from lease sales on the East Coast.75 In 2022, the Department of Labor reported that the Offshore Wind Industry had 38 projects under development, which has the capacity to power around 13 million American homes.76

c. Pretext

Courts may invalidate administrative actions that are taken for reasons other than those stated in the record.77 An asserted rationale without a reasonable connection to the facts is arbitrary where the stated reasons do not match the underlying motivations.78

In Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, the court writes: 

“[The court is] not required to exhibit a naivete from which ordinary citizens are free. The reasoned explanation requirment of administrative law, after all, is meant to ensure that agencies offer genuine justifications for important decisions, reasons that can be scrutinized by courts and the interested public.”79

A court is typically limited to considering the existing administrative record, otherwise, the judicial inquiry may constitute an intrusion into the workings of the executive branch.80 Developers have a robust argument. The Wind Directive was both internally inconsistent and contradictory to other administrative policies. The Wind Directive itself claimed that the United States must provide “reliable” and “afford[able]” energy to its citizens, but halted the permitting of a growing industry that currently provides 73,000 MW of capacity nationally and was projected to attract $65 billion in project investment by 2030.81 The Wind Directive does not explain how this existing capacity is unreliable or unaffordable, much less how the rule change that imposes additional regulatory barriers will lower energy costs and increase capacity. Moreover, the Wind Directive also contradicts the administration’s contemporaneous executive actions that called for increased domestic energy production and curtailed environmental review.82 States and developers may highlight these internal inconsistencies to contend the Wind Directive, and potentially other final administrative actions, are arbitrary and capricious. 

2. Major Questions Doctrine: A Tarriff Application

Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1862 permits the President to, “impose restrictions on goods imports or enter into negotiations with trading partners if the U.S. Secretary of Commerce determines […] that the quantity or other substance of those imports ‘threaten to impair’ national security.”83 In Section 232 investigations, the Secretary of Commerce and the President shall “recognize the close relation of the economic welfare of our nation to national security.”84 Some legislators believe the economic interpretation of national security under Section 232 allocates excessive power to the executive branch.85

When an agency’s claim of authority involves issues of vast economic and political significance, the court is less likely to defer to agency interpretations of their statutory authority when issues at stake are deemed “Major Questions.”86 While the Major Questions Doctrine has historically been applied as a deregulatory tool in areas such as climate, education, and public health, recent lawsuits have argued that the Trump Administration’s tariffs trigger major question concerns.87 In two cases, V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. Trump and Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, businesses have successfully challenged the Trump Administration’s tariff policies in the Federal Circuit under the Major Questions Doctrine.88

In West Virginia v. EPA, the court holds that clear congressional authorization is required for federal agencies to undertake major questions.89 Without explicit congressional authorization, Major Questions actions may constitute an impermissible delegation of power from the legislative branch to the executive. In FCC v. Consumer’s Research, the court suggests that any revenue raising measures, such as tariffs, must be guided by clear statutory standards to satisfy the nondelegation doctrine.90

In addition to a question having economic or political significance, the existence of an extraordinary case must be present.91 This requirement establishes that the challenged action must be unheralded, a transformative expansion of power, and are reasonably economically or politically significant.92

Tariff application in this context would utilize trade power to discourage the development of a specific energy sector without an explanation of a specific national security threat. This policy would transform Section 232 tariff authority into a tool aimed at industrial and environmental regulation. Offshore Wind advocates can point to this application as an unheralded shift; tariff powers are being deployed by the executive to pursue an ideological or policy objective rather than for classic national security objectives. 

In V.O.S. Selections, the Trump Administration cited Yoshida II as a defense of their tariff policy under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. In Yoshida II, the court authorized President Nixon’s issuance of Proclamation 4074 to address a balance of payments deficit. However, in this case, “[Nixon] imposed a limited surcharge, as a temporary measure […] calculated to help meet a particular national emergency, which is quite different from imposing whatever tariff rates he deems desirable.”93 

Though Yoshida II and V.O.S Selections contemplate the limits of a different statute, the court’s calculus is likely applicable here. The Trump Administration’s probe into tariffs for Offshore Wind parts would have a particularly harsh impact due to the nature of the industry’s nascent domestic supply chain. Unlike Yoshida II, where the administration’s tariffs were set at 10%,94 the projected tariffs on the Offshore Wind industry are currently 40-50%.95 Should President Trump enact tariffs on turbines and parts, the cost to the industry is estimated to be around $385 million.96

While Section 232 gives the president the power to regulate imports in matters that threaten to impair U.S. national security, this delegation of power should be proportional and properly justified. Currently, the administration has offered no concrete evidence that the Offshore Wind industry threatens to impair national security. In Fuld v. Pal, the court emphasizes, “[t]he Executive is not free from the ordinary controls and checks of Congress merely because foreign affairs are at issue.”97 

IV. Conclusion

The regulatory upheaval surrounding Offshore Wind development underscores the vulnerability of project financing structures, especially in the context of developing supply chains. As the Offshore Wind industry becomes increasingly political, administrative agencies have relied heavily on executive rulemaking to advance their perspective energy agendas. The Trump Administration’s withdrawal of leasing areas, imposition of tariffs, and implementation of stop work orders are not merely a shift in administrative rules, but structural shocks to a capital intensive, multistage industry. With the APA and the Major Questions Doctrine as tools, developers and states can curb the most extreme exercises of executive discretion. Under the APA, legal challenges to arbitrary and capricious rulemaking remain available to eligible plaintiffs. In the realm of tariffs, there is increasing coverage on the question of whether the president has the broad authority to impose financial sanctions on entire industries. This article finds that it is likely that a president’s power to tariff should be limited when it comes to major questions of political or economic importance. 

For long term regulatory stability when it comes to energy policy, the United States may benefit from the courts and Congress clarifying the limits of executive authority in the realm of long-term permitting processes and broad industry tariffs. Without structural safeguards and limits on the executive branch’s authority, the Offshore Wind industry may remain vulnerable to political cycles that threaten climate progress, business development, and the rule of law. 

• Offshore Wind Energy, Office of Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy, 1, https://perma.cc/BG85-LAA9.
• Sally Jewell, “Toward a Bright Future: The Interior Department’s Record of Progress,” The White House of President Barack Obama, https://perma.cc/9N8S-VXRW.
• U.S. Department of the Interior, “Interior Department to Auction 122,000 Acres Offshore North Carolina for Wind Energy Development,” Department of the Interior, 2, (2025), https://perma.cc/GL53-28T9.
• Lori Bird & Katrina McLaughlin, US Clean Energy Goals Hinge on Faster Permitting, World Res. Inst., 2, (2025), https://perma.cc/PD7X-UATP.
• Bob van der Zwaan et al., Cost Reductions for Offshore Wind Power: Exploring the Balance Between Scaling, Learning and R&D, 41 Renewable Energy 389, 390 (Dec. 3, 2012), https://perma.cc/VV8P-GGX6.
• See generally Gulbahar Tezel & Robert Hensgens, Financing Offshore Wind, PWC, https://perma.cc/2N52-PBA8.
• Nicole Gentile & Kate Kelly, The Trump Administration Is Stifling Renewable Energy on Public Lands and Waters, Center for American Progress, 1 (Jun. 25, 2020), https://perma.cc/Y2UU-N2G2.
• Anastasia E. Lennon, Trump’s War on Offshore Wind: Tracking the Actions and Impacts, New Bedford Light (Sept. 2, 2025), https://perma.cc/H88T-N3KD.
• Adam Hayes, Corporate Finance: Definition and Activities, Investopedia (Mar. 3, 2025). https://perma.cc/WB4K-36DL.
• Id.
• Id.
• Bjarne Steffen, The Importance of Project Finance for Renewable Energy Projects, Energy Econ. 69, 280–94, 281 (2018), https://perma.cc/8EZX-AGQ2.
• AFSIC, Key Components of Successful Project Financing (last visited Oct. 31, 2025), https://perma.cc/9XSS-6Q5B.
• Andrew S. Lewis, Facing a Hostile Administration, U.S. Offshore Wind Is in Retreat, Yale Env’t 360, 9 (Oct. 23, 2025), https://perma.cc/GR49-6EQ5.
• Chad T. Marriott & Heather L. Stewart, Project Finance for Wind Power Projects, Stoel Rives LLP (2022), https://perma.cc/FG4N-FUKL.
• Clare Fieseler, ‘Scare Tactics’ and Uncertainty: What Trump’s Offshore Wind Order Means, Canary Media, 2 (Jan. 22, 2025), https://perma.cc/V3D7-CP8Q.
• Id.
• Nichola Groom, U.S. Agency Again Delays Key Permit for First Major U.S. Offshore Wind Farm, Reuters, 1 (Nov. 12, 2020), https://perma.cc/JAA7-TDMG.
• Clare Fieseler, Trump Claims ‘Wind Mills’ Kill Whales but Quietly Torpedoes the Science, Canary Media (Oct. 23, 2025), https://perma.cc/4CJU-2SX3.
• L. H. Thorne & D. N. Wiley, Evaluating drivers of recent large whale strandings on the East Coast of the United States, 38 Conserv. Biology e14302, at 1 (2024). https://perma.cc/4LMS-8B8Q.
• Id. at 9
• NOAA Fisheries, Frequent Questions: Offshore Wind and Whales, 2 (2025), https://perma.cc/WH9D-UB5X.
• Jen McCann, What is the Permitting Process for Large Wind Farms?, The University of Rhode Island, 2 (Jul. 1, 2020), https://perma.cc/49V7-7QBR.
• See generally Melissa Foster et al., The Law of Wind: A Guide to Business and Legal Issues, Stoel Rives LLP, https://perma.cc/9NC8-ZEWX.
• Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §1341(a).
• U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Sec’y Order No. 3437: Ending Preferential Treatment for Unreliable, Foreign-Controlled Energy Sources in Department Decision-Making (Jul, 29, 2025), https://perma.cc/35X9-9NS4.
• Id.
• Id. at Sec. 1
• Id. at Sec. 5
• Andrea W. Wortzel et al., Renewables in the Crosshairs: DOI and DOT Announce Numerous New Anti-Wind and Solar Orders and Policies, Troutman Pepper Locke, (Aug. 4, 2025), https://perma.cc/P8VM-3AE9.
• Adrijana Buljan, Trump Administration Plans to Revoke Federal Approval for 2 GW Maryland Offshore Wind Project, offshoreWIND.biz, Aug. 27, 2025, https://perma.cc/V5P7-NSU5.
• Id. at 1
• Ørsted A/S, Revolution Wind Receives Offshore Stop-Work Order (Aug. 19, 2025), https://perma.cc/4YRW-8L4V.
• Joshua Belcher et al., Potential Implications of President Trump’s Wind Energy EO on Offshore Leasing Development, Holland & Knight, 4 (2025), https://perma.cc/BFD4-9JXJ.
• Project-financed infrastructure can be particularly sensitive to delays because lenders look primarily to the project’s future cash flows for repayment, rather than a traditional sponsor balance sheet. When permitting or construction is delayed, costs increase through extended construction expenses, standby commitments, and interest accrued during construction, while the start of revenue generation is pushed further into the future. As a result, even modest delays can materially reduce debt-service coverage ratios and risk covenant breaches or default (because debt service obligations are largely fixed). For more information on project-finance see Export Development Canada, Overview of Project Financing, 2-3 (2019), https://perma.cc/X2NH-ZGQL.
• Stanley Reed, Wind Energy Giant Orsted Says Delays in U.S. May Cost 2 Billion, The New York Times, 1 (Aug. 30, 2023), https://perma.cc/6HD5-5F7V.
• Id. at 2
• Ros Davidson, Avangrid Asks to Abandon ‘Uneconomic’ PPAs as Utilities Decline to Renegotiate, Wind Power Monthly (Dec. 20, 2022), https://perma.cc/RF7J-8R27.
• See generally Diana DiGangi, PPAs Rejected for Avangrid, Orsted-Eversource Offshore Wind Projects, Utility Dive (Jul. 20, 2023), https://perma.cc/B43A-BDR9.
• James T. Tynion III et al., Executive Order Halts Offshore Wind Leasing, Orders Review of Federal Leasing and Permitting Practices for Wind Projects, Morgan Lewis (Jan. 22, 2025) https://perma.cc/Y4BV-679A.
• Henry Smith, Considering Political Risks When Investing in Renewable Energy, Control Risk 13 (Aug  24, 2021), https://perma.cc/P5T2-VTD9.
• Everything You’d Like to Know About Offshore Wind Farm Construction, Iberdrola, 4, (2025) https://perma.cc/L3BR-73ND.
• Alex Brown, Trump Has Crushed Offshore Wind Plans, but States Haven’t Quite Given Up Hope, Stateline (Sept. 16, 2025), https://perma.cc/ZL6E-8F3P.
• Presidential 2025 Tariff Actions: Timeline and Status (2025), https://perma.cc/EG7C-P3U9. See also Lennon, supra note 8.
• Id.
• Trade Expansion Act of 1962 § 232, 19 U.S.C. § 1862 (2024). See also Lewis, supra note 14.
• Id.
• Id.
• Diana DiGangi, Trump’s Offshore Wind Policies Limit Industry’s Near-Term Growth: Morningstar DBRS Vice President, Utility Dive (Apr. 10, 2025), https://perma.cc/Y559-VFQE.
• Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–178 (1997).
• NRDC v. Wheeler, 955 F.3d 68, 79–80 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
• Id.
• 5 U.S.C. § 704
• 5 U.S.C.A. § 706 (2) (A)
• Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962).
• Mot. for Preliminary Injunction, Revolution Wind, LLC, v. Burgum, WL 2550508 (D.D.C. September 4, 2025).
• Revolution Wind, LLC, v. Burgum, 1:25-cv-02999 (D.D.C. September 22, 2025). https://perma.cc/DR3R-HAWU.
• Sean Curtis, ‘Life or Death Situation for This Project’: U.S. Wind Requests Preliminary Injunction Against Trump Administration, WBOC, 1 (Oct. 16, 2025), https://perma.cc/8ZHT-PP8Y.
• Mot. For Preliminary Injunction, State of Rhode Island v. Burgum, C.A. No. 1:25-cv-00439, (C.A. Filed September 17, 2025), https://perma.cc/W35D-JKSY.
• Western Watersheds Project v. Bureau of Land Management, 629 F.Supp.2d 951 (2009).
• Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 156 (1997).
• State of New York et al. v. Donald J. Trump et al., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, No. 1:25-cv-00039-JJM-PAS, 3 (D.R.I. Jan. 28 2025), https://perma.cc/5FSR-ADXF.
• Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U. S. 156, 167–169 (1962).
• Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
• 90 Fed. Reg. at 8363.
• McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force, 375 F.3d 1182, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
• Jonah Ury et al., Pathways to Commercial Liftoff: Offshore Wind, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, at 11 (Apr. 2024), https://perma.cc/A4KL-6Z3W.
• F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009). See also Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), 517 U.S. 735, 742 (1996).
• Dep't. of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1896 (2020).
• Mot. For Preliminary Injunction, State of Rhode Island v. Burgum, supra footnote 50.
• Dep't. of Homeland Sec., 140 S. Ct. 1891 at 1901.
• Id.
• Id.
• Jeff St. John, How Will Offshore Wind Fare under a Second Trump Term?, Canary Media, (Nov. 13, 2024), https://perma.cc/4LYX-VEB5.
• U.S. Dep’t of Energy & Nat’l Renewable Energy Laboratory, Offshore Wind Market Report: 2022 Edition, 22 (Sept. 2022), https://perma.cc/7QW6-LC8V.
• Id.
• Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 588 U.S 752, 755 (2019).
• Id.
• Dep't of Com. v. New York, 588 U.S. 752, 785 (2019) (citing United States v. Stanchich, 550 F.2d 1294, 1300 (CA2 1977)).

• Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 268, n. 18 (1977).
• American Clean Power Association, Offshore Wind Power Facts (2025), https://perma.cc/V4D2-3NU8.
• State of New York et al. v. Donald J. Trump et al., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, No. 1:25-cv-00039-JJM-PAS, 5 (D.R.I. Jan. 28, 2025), https://perma.cc/D93X-JTUX.
• Trade Expansion Act, 19 U.S.C. § 1862.
• Kyla H. Kitamura, Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, CRS In Focus No. IF13006, 1 (Jul. 16, 2025), https://perma.cc/HL9H-Z26T.
• Id. at 2
• See West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697 (2022), FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
• Adam Liptak, Will Trump’s Tariffs Survive Supreme Court’s ‘Major Questions’ Test?, Seattle Times (Oct. 14, 2025), https://perma.cc/X24L-6A7P.
• Christina Zaroulis Milnor & Kendall Williams, Tariffs, Trump, and the Courts: The Major Questions Doctrine Strikes Again, Cranfill Sumner LLP (Sept. 29, 2025), https://perma.cc/KGU9-63AQ.
• West Virginia, 597 U.S. at 724.
• Federal Communications Commission v. Consumers’ Research, 606 U.S. 656, 2492 (2025).
• Kelly McGee, The Major Questions Doctrine Applies to President Trump’s Tariffs, Yale J. on Reg. Notice & Comment (May 20, 2025), https://perma.cc/ZSH8-C5Z4.
• Id.
• United States v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 526 F.2d 560, 577 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
• Id.
• William Rampe, Commerce is Investigating Tariffs on Imports of Wind Turbines and Their Parts, Institute for Energy Research (Sept. 17, 2025), https://perma.cc/6KVR-UP25.
• Id.
• Fuld v. Pal. Liberation Org., 606 U.S. 1, 19, 145 S.Ct. 2090, L.Ed.2d (2025).