This article examines the fairness of new money financing in corporate restructuring through a comparative lens. It focuses on recent developments in the United Kingdom, where the Court of Appeal has incrementally adopted the American approach of benchmarking returns on exit financing to the financial markets. This is a welcome development, and promotes distributional fairness in the United Kingdom’s corporate restructuring regime. However, this article strikes a note of caution, arguing that robust judicial review is essential to prevent gamesmanship and manipulation of the process by sophisticated players.
Online Edition '26
Consecutive
2026
This article examines Judge Mehta's remedies order in United States v. Google LLC and its implications for the future of Section 2 enforcement. It traces the evolution of antitrust remedies from the structural dissolutions of the early twentieth century through Microsoft, and argues that Google completes the transition elevating behavioral supervision from a second-best fallback into the dominant mode of market correction. The piece analyzes the court's decisions to decline structural relief, approve narrowly tailored data-sharing and syndication obligations, establish a Technical Committee, and extend remedial coverage to generative AI. It then evaluates the institutional consequences of this "behavioral antitrust realism," weighing its advantages in flexibility, consumer welfare preservation, and remedial fit against the risks of judicial drift into an open-ended regulatory role that antitrust law has historically sought to avoid.
This article examines the Sixth Circuit’s decision in NLRB v. Starbucks and its implications for the NLRB’s authority to award expanded “make-whole” remedies under Thryv. It explains how the court upheld the unfair labor practice finding but rejected broader compensation for “direct or foreseeable pecuniary harms,” deepening a circuit split over whether those remedies are valid equitable relief or impermissible consequential damages. The piece argues that, despite the Sixth Circuit’s narrower reading of Section 10(c), there is still room for carefully tailored Thryv-style remedies that restore workers without exceeding statutory or constitutional limits.
Private equity (PE) funds control over $9 trillion in assets and thousands of companies, yet their leverage-driven model often amplifies financial fragility and social harm. This article argues that the core tools of PE value creation—high leverage, cash extraction, and short-term exit incentives—externalize predictable risks to third parties including workers, healthcare patients, consumers, unsecured creditors, communities and the environment. Drawing on empirical studies, it identifies how debt-amplified fragility and profit-pressure dynamics can degrade quality, safety, and resilience particularly in sensitive sectors such as healthcare, energy, education, childcare and corrections. This article proposes a targeted regulatory framework to internalize these costs, including leverage-indexed insurance and bonding, minimum staffing and quality standards, and ownership-linked disclosure reforms focused on these sensitive sectors. These limited, pragmatic measures would preserve the benefits of the PE investment model while realigning incentives toward long-term stability and social welfare.