Aligning Incentives: Finding a Better Way Forward with Special Purpose Acquisition Companies
Special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs) first began to emerge in the 1990s as an alternative means to conduct an initial public offering (IPO) and take private companies public.1
Special Purpose Acquisition Companies, Shell Companies, and Projections, 86 Fed. Reg. 29458 (proposed Mar. 30, 2022) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. at pt. 210, 229, 230, 232, 239, 240, 249, 270).
Although SPACs may be seen as an appealing alternative pathway for raising financial capital and bringing companies public, the diverging interests between the major parties to a SPAC venture and the lack of adequate checks on a SPAC’s decision to proceed once it has identified a promising private company (the “Target Company”) are likely leaving some unsophisticated investors insufficiently protected within the current framework of limited disclosures and information asymmetries. This Article suggests that by altering the compensation structure for the sophisticated investor or management team that forms a SPAC (the “Sponsor”), the Sponsor’s financial interests can be more closely aligned with that of the other investors. Achieving this should leave the Sponsor in a well-suited position, and with adequate financial incentive, to conduct meaningful due diligence on Target Companies that will better protect unsophisticated investors in SPACs.
II. Analysis
TOPA. What are Special Purpose Acquisition Companies?
TOPA special purpose acquisition company is a shell corporation that is formed for the sole purpose of raising capital through an IPO and using that capital to merge with an existing private company, thereby bringing that company public.2
Julie Young, Special Purpose Acquisition Company (SPAC) Explained: Examples and Risks, Investopedia (Mar. 15, 2023), https://perma.cc/24YE-WK5T.
Id.
What is a SPAC and Why are They Suddenly so Popular, Excelsior Capital, https://perma.cc/DJZ6-KKCC(last visited Oct. 26, 2023).
Id.
Mike Bellin, Why Companies Are Joining the SPAC Boom, PwC (Sept. 22, 2020), https://perma.cc/3VY7-433Q;Max H. Bazerman & Paresh Patel, SPACs: What You Need to Know, Harv. Bus. Rev. (July–Aug. 2021), https://perma.cc/L5C6-FTKY.
Bazerman & Patel, supra note 6.
Delman v. GigAcquisitions3, LLC, 288 A.3d 692, 701 (Del. Ch. 2023).
SPACs are typically formed by a Sponsor who, in exchange for a nominal initial capital investment, often secures a 20-25% interest in the SPAC (the “Founder Shares”).9
See How Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs) Work, PwC, https://perma.cc/83S8-ERDK(last visited Oct. 25, 2023) [hereinafter How SPACs Work].
Bazerman & Patel, supra note 6.
For each share purchased, the investor is typically offered a warrant, or a fraction of a warrant, that gives the investor the right to purchase additional shares of common stock at some established price in the future.11
Id.
SPACs Explained, Fidelity (Mar. 1, 2022), https://perma.cc/5MVB-WDV4.
Frank Fagan & Saul Levmore, SPACs, PIPEs, and Common Investors, 25 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 103, 109 (2023) (“During this ‘pre-deal’ period . . . the market value of the SPAC shares reflects that of a short-term fixed income investment, as well as the expected value of a merger.”).
From inception, SPACs normally have anywhere from 18 months to two years to identify a Target Company, negotiate a merger with the Target Company, receive approval for the merger from the investors, and successfully complete the merger with the private company (often referred to as “de-SPACing”).14
How SPACs Work, supra note 9.
Paul Munter, Financial Reporting and Auditing Considerations of Companies Merging with SPACs, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Mar. 31, 2021), https://perma.cc/443J-ZKUT.
How SPACs Work, supra note 9.
However, even if a Sponsor finds a Target Company and SPAC investors vote in favor of a merger, investors who do not believe the Target Company is promising—or who want to exit the arrangement for any other reason prior to the merger—are still able to exercise their “redemption right to get their money back in advance [of the merger],” including any accumulated interest on the initial investment.17
James Chen, SPACs Look Like a Bubble Within a Bubble, Investopedia (Feb. 9, 2021), https://perma.cc/B7AC-JJAQ.
Id.
Id.
With the existence of these redemption rights, Sponsors may worry that too many investors will choose to exercise these rights, leaving the SPAC with insufficient funds to complete a potential merger. For this reason, after raising the initial funds for the SPAC, the Sponsor may seek to raise additional capital from private investments in public equities (PIPEs).20
See SPACs Explained, supra note 12.
Bazerman & Patel, supra note 6.
Id.
B. Legal and Regulatory Framework Governing SPACs
TOPAlthough not explicitly governed by the requirements of Rule 419 under the Securities Act of 1933, SPACs still largely follow these requirements as a way to promote investment,23
See Special Purpose Acquisition Companies, Shell Companies, and Projections, supra note 1.
17 C.F.R. § 230.419.
See Young, supra note 2.
Delman v. GigAcquisitions3, LLC, 288 A.3d 692, 713–14 (Del. Ch. 2023).
Id.
While final judgment on the merits of this issue has not yet been reached in any of these cases, the Court of Chancery of Delaware—through denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss in In re Multiplan Corp. Shareholders Litigation28
268 A.3d 784 (Del. Ch. 2022).
Id. at 792.
Id. at 800.
Research conducted on SPAC performance from 2019 through the first half of 2020 suggested that “although the creators of SPACs were doing well, their investors were not.”31
Bazerman & Patel, supra note 6.
Yun Li, SPAC Lawsuits Jump in Another Sign of Suspect Deal-Making for the Once Red-Hot Space, CNBC (Aug. 9, 2021, 6:11 AM ET), https://perma.cc/2WVZ-NQVE.
Munter, supra note 15.
E. Ramey Layne & K. Stancell Haigwood, SPAC Regulation—Past, Present and Future, 45 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 233, 233 (2022).
Special Purpose Acquisition Companies, Shell Companies, and Projections, supra note 1, at 29463.
Erin Gordon et al., M&A, Professional Perspective - SEC’s Proposed SPAC Rules & Market Reaction, Bloomberg Law (Sept. 2022), https://perma.cc/ZL3V-K6CM.
C. Competing Incentives Among the Major SPAC Parties
TOPAlthough the adoption of new regulations would likely lead to increased protection for SPAC investors, the worry is that over-regulating this space could lead to an overall decrease in the viability of using SPACs to bring Target Companies public. Reflecting on the SEC’s three-part mission, one can begin to see the inherent tension between protecting investors on the one hand and continuing to facilitate capital formation by way of SPACs on the other.37
Munter, supra note 15.
Layne & Haigwood, supra note 34, at 235.
Bazerman & Patel, supra note 6.
Sponsors have a strong interest in successfully merging with a Target Company to capitalize upon their investment of time, effort, and funds. This is so because Sponsors are largely compensated with Founder Shares, which only pay out if the de-SPACing process is completed. Potential problems arise due to the radically different compensation schemes between Sponsors and investors, such that Sponsors may be financially motivated to find a sub-par private company and try to force a merger through in such a way that it would result in a profit for the Sponsors to the financial detriment of the investors who chose not to exercise their redemption rights.40
Delman v. GigAcquisitions3, LLC, 288 A.3d 692, 708 (Del. Ch. 2023).
For Target Companies, one of the primary interests is to extract as much value out of the negotiations as possible. Being able to negotiate its own acquisition agreement may lead to higher valuations41
Bellin, supra note 6.
How SPACs Work, supra note 9.
Bazerman & Patel, supra note 6.
Less sophisticated retail investors are often motivated to engage in SPAC dealings due to the appeal of joining forces with savvy investors and directly engaging in the IPO space. Additionally, with the warrants and redemption rights, these ventures seem like a relatively low-risk investment. The real problems often emerge for the minority of investors who decide not to exercise their redemption rights before de-SPACing occurs.44
See Usha Rodrigues & Michael Stegemoller, Redeeming SPACs, University of Georgia School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2021-09, 44–45 (2021).
With the two largest players—the Sponsors and the Target Companies—often pushing forward to close the deal, unwary investors “unable to fully assess the quality of a deal” can end up getting stranded.45
Jeffrey Goldfarb, SPAC Shell Games Will Keep Hiding the Ball, Reuters (Oct. 5, 2023, 10:44 AM CT), https://perma.cc/62W8-JB6B.
Fagan & Levmore, supra note 13, at 126–27.
Still, as valuable an indicator as the presence of PIPEs may be, it is, of course, no panacea for the many concerns facing investors. First, investors may still be left questioning whether the PIPE investor has conducted a quality investigation of the SPAC. Second, smaller investors with whom we ought to be concerned may not fully understand the presence or absence of a PIPE investor to be such a strong market signal. Third, there simply appear to be far more SPACs than there are PIPEs. This asymmetry may lead us to be more confident in the quality of the SPAC with which the PIPE ends up aligning;47
Id.
The core problem with this dynamic is that “[t]here is no player structurally incentivized to second-guess the decision to go public.”48
Rodrigues & Stegemoller, supra note 44, at 45.
Id.
Daniele D’Alvia & Milos Vulanovic, Capital Markets, Professional Perspective - The Promise and Limits of a SPAC Revolution, Bloomberg Law (Sept. 2020), https://perma.cc/SGX9-3BGQ.
This, coupled with the fact that investors could simultaneously vote for a merger while still choosing to exercise their redemption rights, creates the possibility of empty voting “where the economics of the transaction are misaligned with the formal vote.”51
Rodrigues & Stegemoller, supra note 44, at 5.
Id.
See Fagan & Levmore, supra note 13, at 111.
Commentators have suggested that the relevant gap for assessing the magnitude of dilutions to the normal SPAC shareholder is the difference between the purchase price of a SPAC share (standardized at $10.00) and the amount of cash per share left in the SPAC upon delivery to the target. An estimate of this difference from January 2019 to June 2020, for the median SPAC, is $5.70. If so, the target must indeed be well chosen for the original investment by the public investor to be worthwhile. Id.
D. Aligning Incentives Among the Major SPAC Parties
TOPFinding a solution to these problems that will strike a balance between adequately protecting investors and continuing to facilitate capital formation by way of SPACs will be challenging. By considering the varied interests of the relevant parties to the SPAC transaction, a few guiding principles appear to emerge that would seem to offer a path toward better aligning the interests of these parties while reducing the occurrence rate of conflicted interest transactions.
Providing unsophisticated investors with additional information and disclosures is certainly a good start but not enough on its own. The real difficulty is that without a PIPE-like entity serving the important role of evaluating the quality of the SPAC, no other single actor is sufficiently incentivized to conduct this due diligence. Sponsors can, of course, assist in this process of conducting due diligence and making disclosures to investors, but even such disclosures “are complex and suffer from a lack of standardization” that serves to reduce the positive impact disclosures can have for investors.54
Rodrigues & Stegemoller, supra note 44, at 46.
See supra note 28.
Although there appear to be problems with relying on the Sponsor to gather and disclose material information, it does seem that with modifications the Sponsor could become the best situated party for this task. Changing the compensation structure for the Sponsor in a way that more closely aligns the Sponsor’s financial interests with the rest of the investors should further incentivize the Sponsor to investigate Target Companies in a way that will better protect the financial interests of unsophisticated investors. This proposed compensation modification would likely have to be brought about from within the SPACs themselves, but self-imposed regulation is no foreign concept in the world of SPACs.56
See supra Section B.
See In re MultiPlan Corp. Shareholders Litigation, 268 A.3d 784 (Del. Ch. 2022).
Carson S. Clear, Saving SPACs from the SEC's Potentially Ruinous Overreach, 72 Emory L. J. 1017, 1034 (2023).
Finding the right “new” compensation scheme for Sponsors will be no easy task. Any such plan should motivate Sponsors to conduct proper and adequate due diligence and ensure that serving in the role of a Sponsor may still be profitable enough to sufficiently compensate Sponsors for their time, energy, effort, and risk. In terms of the actual changes that might be made to accomplish these goals, one potential way forward would be to change how Founder Shares are structured. Instead of securing a 20-25% interest in the SPAC from the outset for a nominal initial capital investment, a portion of the Sponsor’s potential stake should be linked to the long-term performance of the post-merger public company.59
See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305, 309–10 (1976) (exploring how compensation structures can be used to “provide appropriate incentives for the agent to make choices which will maximize the principal’s welfare, given that uncertainty and imperfect monitoring exist”).
For example, perhaps the Sponsor would only get a 10-15% interest at the outset; however, depending on how successful the new public company were to become post-merger, the Sponsor would be able to earn the equivalent of bonuses linked proportionally to the company’s performance. These bonuses could be arranged in a way that the Sponsor might end up with as much of a stake as if the Sponsor had initially been given a 30-35% interest in the SPAC.
Decreasing the initial percentage of shares received when becoming a Sponsor would make forcing through a bad merger with an undesirable Target Company less financially appealing to the Sponsor. The Sponsor would also then have an added incentive not only to find a higher quality Target Company at the outset but also to remain involved after de-SPACing in the hope of capitalizing on future bonuses tied to corporate success. While this may result in lower profits for Sponsors depending on the compensation formula employed, this new compensation scheme may well provide a more sustainable way forward for SPACs and, if adopted, may lead to a renewed interest in this alternative means to conduct an IPO.
Sponsor bonuses would likely have to be negotiated with Target Companies during the pre-merger process. What would a Target Company’s incentive be to consider adopting such terms? Target Companies presumably want to go public and be successful in the long run. With flexibility to negotiate with SPACs in the pre-merger process, deals could be set up specifically to serve these two vital interests. Target Companies could establish well-defined corporate performance metrics that must be achieved as a prerequisite to pay Sponsor bonuses. The takeaway from all this is that adopting a new compensation structure along these lines might be able to strike the right balance between the interests of all key parties involved.
III. Conclusion
TOPSPACs provide an alternative route to the traditional IPO to raise capital and take privately held companies public. While the rate of SPAC mergers continues to decrease significantly,60
Statista Research Department, Number of Special Purpose Acquisition Company (SPAC) IPOs in the United States from 2003 to August 2023, Statista (Aug. 21, 2023), https://perma.cc/8FKN-E997(noting that the number of SPACs declined from a peak of 613 in 2021 to only 86 in 2022).
By modifying Sponsor compensation in a way that serves to better align the interests of the principal parties in a SPAC venture, the Sponsor should be incentivized to conduct additional due diligence and make further disclosures in a manner that better safeguards interests of investors who decide not to exercise their redemption rights before de-SPACing occurs. Also, by adopting Sponsor bonuses linked to long-term success of the post-merger company, Sponsors should be even more motivated to identify quality Target Companies and remain involved to promote the success of the merged company. With ongoing concerns of exposure to litigation and new proposed regulation still being considered by the SEC, the time may be ripe for SPAC Sponsors to recognize the appeal of implementing greater self-regulation while also fashioning supplemental compensation arrangements that incentivize conduct likely to benefit all SPAC participants. Doing so may very well lead to a resurgence in the use of SPACs and provide a more desirable and acceptable way forward for SPACs.
- 1Special Purpose Acquisition Companies, Shell Companies, and Projections, 86 Fed. Reg. 29458 (proposed Mar. 30, 2022) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. at pt. 210, 229, 230, 232, 239, 240, 249, 270).
- 2Julie Young, Special Purpose Acquisition Company (SPAC) Explained: Examples and Risks, Investopedia (Mar. 15, 2023), https://perma.cc/24YE-WK5T.
- 3Id.
- 4What is a SPAC and Why are They Suddenly so Popular, Excelsior Capital, https://perma.cc/DJZ6-KKCC(last visited Oct. 26, 2023).
- 5Id.
- 6Mike Bellin, Why Companies Are Joining the SPAC Boom, PwC (Sept. 22, 2020), https://perma.cc/3VY7-433Q;Max H. Bazerman & Paresh Patel, SPACs: What You Need to Know, Harv. Bus. Rev. (July–Aug. 2021), https://perma.cc/L5C6-FTKY.
- 7Bazerman & Patel, supra note 6.
- 8Delman v. GigAcquisitions3, LLC, 288 A.3d 692, 701 (Del. Ch. 2023).
- 9See How Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs) Work, PwC, https://perma.cc/83S8-ERDK(last visited Oct. 25, 2023) [hereinafter How SPACs Work].
- 10Bazerman & Patel, supra note 6.
- 11Id.
- 12SPACs Explained, Fidelity (Mar. 1, 2022), https://perma.cc/5MVB-WDV4.
- 13Frank Fagan & Saul Levmore, SPACs, PIPEs, and Common Investors, 25 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 103, 109 (2023) (“During this ‘pre-deal’ period . . . the market value of the SPAC shares reflects that of a short-term fixed income investment, as well as the expected value of a merger.”).
- 14How SPACs Work, supra note 9.
- 15Paul Munter, Financial Reporting and Auditing Considerations of Companies Merging with SPACs, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Mar. 31, 2021), https://perma.cc/443J-ZKUT.
- 16How SPACs Work, supra note 9.
- 17James Chen, SPACs Look Like a Bubble Within a Bubble, Investopedia (Feb. 9, 2021), https://perma.cc/B7AC-JJAQ.
- 18Id.
- 19Id.
- 20See SPACs Explained, supra note 12.
- 21Bazerman & Patel, supra note 6.
- 22Id.
- 23See Special Purpose Acquisition Companies, Shell Companies, and Projections, supra note 1.
- 2417 C.F.R. § 230.419.
- 25See Young, supra note 2.
- 26Delman v. GigAcquisitions3, LLC, 288 A.3d 692, 713–14 (Del. Ch. 2023).
- 27Id.
- 28268 A.3d 784 (Del. Ch. 2022).
- 29Id. at 792.
- 30Id. at 800.
- 31Bazerman & Patel, supra note 6.
- 32Yun Li, SPAC Lawsuits Jump in Another Sign of Suspect Deal-Making for the Once Red-Hot Space, CNBC (Aug. 9, 2021, 6:11 AM ET), https://perma.cc/2WVZ-NQVE.
- 33Munter, supra note 15.
- 34E. Ramey Layne & K. Stancell Haigwood, SPAC Regulation—Past, Present and Future, 45 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 233, 233 (2022).
- 35Special Purpose Acquisition Companies, Shell Companies, and Projections, supra note 1, at 29463.
- 36Erin Gordon et al., M&A, Professional Perspective - SEC’s Proposed SPAC Rules & Market Reaction, Bloomberg Law (Sept. 2022), https://perma.cc/ZL3V-K6CM.
- 37Munter, supra note 15.
- 38Layne & Haigwood, supra note 34, at 235.
- 39Bazerman & Patel, supra note 6.
- 40Delman v. GigAcquisitions3, LLC, 288 A.3d 692, 708 (Del. Ch. 2023).
- 41Bellin, supra note 6.
- 42How SPACs Work, supra note 9.
- 43Bazerman & Patel, supra note 6.
- 44See Usha Rodrigues & Michael Stegemoller, Redeeming SPACs, University of Georgia School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2021-09, 44–45 (2021).
- 45Jeffrey Goldfarb, SPAC Shell Games Will Keep Hiding the Ball, Reuters (Oct. 5, 2023, 10:44 AM CT), https://perma.cc/62W8-JB6B.
- 46Fagan & Levmore, supra note 13, at 126–27.
- 47Id.
- 48Rodrigues & Stegemoller, supra note 44, at 45.
- 49Id.
- 50Daniele D’Alvia & Milos Vulanovic, Capital Markets, Professional Perspective - The Promise and Limits of a SPAC Revolution, Bloomberg Law (Sept. 2020), https://perma.cc/SGX9-3BGQ.
- 51Rodrigues & Stegemoller, supra note 44, at 5.
- 52Id.
- 53See Fagan & Levmore, supra note 13, at 111.
Commentators have suggested that the relevant gap for assessing the magnitude of dilutions to the normal SPAC shareholder is the difference between the purchase price of a SPAC share (standardized at $10.00) and the amount of cash per share left in the SPAC upon delivery to the target. An estimate of this difference from January 2019 to June 2020, for the median SPAC, is $5.70. If so, the target must indeed be well chosen for the original investment by the public investor to be worthwhile. Id.
- 54Rodrigues & Stegemoller, supra note 44, at 46.
- 55See supra note 28.
- 56See supra Section B.
- 57See In re MultiPlan Corp. Shareholders Litigation, 268 A.3d 784 (Del. Ch. 2022).
- 58Carson S. Clear, Saving SPACs from the SEC's Potentially Ruinous Overreach, 72 Emory L. J. 1017, 1034 (2023).
- 59See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305, 309–10 (1976) (exploring how compensation structures can be used to “provide appropriate incentives for the agent to make choices which will maximize the principal’s welfare, given that uncertainty and imperfect monitoring exist”).
- 60Statista Research Department, Number of Special Purpose Acquisition Company (SPAC) IPOs in the United States from 2003 to August 2023, Statista (Aug. 21, 2023), https://perma.cc/8FKN-E997(noting that the number of SPACs declined from a peak of 613 in 2021 to only 86 in 2022).