The Surprising Survival—So Far—of the Corporate Contribution Ban
In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,1
See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
See, e.g., FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 207 (1982).
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 349, 354, 356.
Id. at 364–65.
The Court’s emphatic language would appear to doom all special restrictions on the use of corporate money in elections—contributions as well as expenditures. After all, in Buckley v. Valeo,5
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14–23 (1976).
Id. at 20 (a contribution limit “entails only a marginal restriction upon the contributor’s ability to engage in free communication”).
See, e.g., Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006); McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185 (2014); FEC v. Cruz, 596 U.S. 289 (2022). See also Thompson v. Hebdon, 589 U.S. 1 (2019) (vacating and remanding lower court decision dismissing challenge to state’s contribution limits).
Yet, Citizens United notwithstanding, the 117-year-old federal ban on corporate campaign contributions and similar prohibitions in twenty-one states remain on the books and continue to apply.8
Nat’l Conf. State Legislatures, State Limits on Contributions to Candidates, 2023-2024 Election Cycle, (last updated May 2023), https://perma.cc/T4AU-9YDR.
See, e.g., United States v. Emmons, 8 F.4th 454 (6th Cir. 2021); 1A Auto, Inc. v. Dir. of Off. of Campaign & Pol. Fin, 105 N.E.3d 1175 (Mass. 2018); Yamada v. Snipes, 786 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 2015); Cath. Leadership Coal. of Texas v. Reisman, 764 F.3d 409, 441–45 (5th Cir. 2014); Iowa Right To Life Comm., Inc. v. Tooker, 717 F.3d 576 (8th Cir. 2013); Minnesota Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, 692 F.3d 864 (8th Cir. 2012) (en banc); United States v. Danielczyk, 683 F.3d 611 (4th Cir. 2012); Ognibene v. Parkes, 671 F.3d 174 (2d. Cir. 2011); Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, 645 F.3d 1109, 1124–26 (9th Cir. 2011); Green Party of Connecticut v. Garfield, 616 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2010).
FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003).
It is not clear how long these arguments will continue to have force. In recent cases, the Court has questioned the significance of the anti-circumvention rationale.11
See, e.g., Cruz, 598 U.S. at 306; McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 221; FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 479 (2007).
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 361–62.
For now, at least, the corporate campaign contribution ban remains a part of campaign finance regulation in federal elections and in nearly half the states. This Article examines the history of corporate contribution regulation, its current status, and its potential future. Part II traces the ban’s statutory and doctrinal development. Part III analyzes how the courts over the last fourteen years have threaded the needle of sustaining the corporate contribution ban notwithstanding Citizens United. Part IV addresses other developments in the Supreme Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence that threaten the survival of the corporate contribution ban. Part V provides brief descriptions of possible alternatives to a corporate contribution ban. Part VI concludes with some speculations about the persistence of the corporate contribution ban.
Concern about the impact of the “money and power of a great corporation” on American democracy can be seen at least as far back as Andrew Jackson’s battle with the Second Bank of the United States,13
In his Fifth Annual Message to Congress, President Jackson reported that the Bank, a “great and powerful institution[,]” has been “actively engaged in attempting to influence the elections of the public officers by means of its money . . . .” Andrew Jackson, Fifth Annual Message, December 03, 1833, The Am. Presidency Project, https://perma.cc/6ZUK-U5JB (last visited Apr. 6, 2024). To combat this “electioneering engine,” the government would withdraw its deposits from the Bank:
In this point of the case the question is distinctly presented whether the people of the United States are to govern through representatives chosen by their unbiased suffrages or whether the money and power of a great corporation are to be secretly exerted to influence their judgment and control their decisions. It must now be determined whether the Bank is to have its candidates for all offices in the country, from the highest to the lowest, or whether candidates on both sides of political questions shall be brought forward as heretofore and supported by the usual means.
Id.
See Adam Winkler, Citizens United, Personhood, and the Corporation in Politics, in Corporations and American Democracy 359, 368 (Naomi R. Lamoreaux & William J. Novak eds., 2017).
See Margaret M. Blair & Elizabeth Pollman, The Supreme Court’s View of Corporate Rights: Two Centuries of Evolution and Controversy, in Corporations and American Democracy 245, 275 (Naomi R. Lamoreaux & William J. Novak eds., 2017).
In 1891, Kentucky amended its constitution to ban the use of corporate money to influence any election in the state; that provision is still in the Kentucky constitution.16
Ky. Const., § 159.
Perry Belmont, Publicity of Election Expenditures, 180 The No. Am. Rev. 166, 176 (1905).
Elihu Root, The Political Use of Money, September 3, 1894, in Addresses on Government and Citizenship 141, 143 (collected and edited by Robert Bacon & James Brown Scott, Harv. Univ. Press 1916).
Id. at 144.
Concern about corporate political influence grew in the aftermath of public reports that President Theodore Roosevelt’s 1904 reelection campaign received more than a million dollars (around $35 million in 2024 dollars) from corporate sources. Then, in 1905, the New York Legislative Investigating Committee (the Armstrong Committee) revealed that New York’s three major insurance committees had contributed hundreds of thousands of dollars to the Republican Party and Republican officeholders in recent elections. The Armstrong Committee hearings confirmed not only the power of corporations to influence the political process but also that the executives of these businesses used corporate donations to benefit themselves rather than their shareholders (or, for the insurance companies, their policyholders) by pushing for new laws that would make it more difficult for policyholders to sue for breach of fiduciary duty.20
See Winkler, supra note 14, at 359.
Id.
In his 1905 Annual Message to Congress, President Roosevelt inveighed against the “corruption of the flagrant kind which has been exposed[,]” and proclaimed that “[a]ll contributions by corporations to any political committee or for any political purpose should be forbidden by law . . . .”22
Theodore Roosevelt, Fifth Annual Message to Congress, December 05, 1905, The Am. Presidency Project, https://perma.cc/VSV3-KX7L (last visited Apr. 6, 2024).
Theodore Roosevelt, Sixth Annual Message to Congress, December 03, 1906, The Am. Presidency Project, https://perma.cc/DSJ2-SKNX (last visited Apr. 6, 2024).
Tillman Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864.
Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, 43 Stat. 1070.
52 U.S.C. § 30118(a).
See Earl R. Sikes, State and Federal Corrupt-Practices Legislation 127–28 (1928).
Subsequent developments in the legislative restriction of corporate campaign money were a response to the growing political role of labor unions. In the aftermath of the New Deal, unions increasingly engaged in electoral politics, and some members of Congress urged that organized labor had become comparable in power and influence to big business.28
David J. Sousa, “No Balance in the Equities”: Union Power in the Making and Unmaking of the Campaign Finance Regime, 13 Stud. Am. Pol. Dev. 374, 380–83 (1999).
Id. at 381–85.
Pub. L. No. 78-89, 57 Stat. 163 (1943).
Pub. L. No. 101-120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947). Many states adopted similar restrictions. Today, twenty states prohibit unions from contributing to candidates for state office. See Nat’l Conf. State Legislatures, supra note 8.
Although aimed at unions, the Taft-Hartley Act also applied to corporations. To avoid the wartime ban on union contributions, the Congress of Industrial Organization (CIO) had created an organization named the CIO Political Action Committee or CIO-PAC, the eponymous PAC that is the forerunner of all of today’s PACs. As a separate entity with its own officers and a treasury filled with ostensibly voluntary contributions by union members, the CIO-PAC was not itself a union and, so, not subject to the union contribution ban. Moreover, instead of contributing to candidates it spent money rallying support for the Democratic ticket among union members, other employees, and their families and communities.32
See Louise Overacker, American Government and Politics: Presidential Campaign Funds, 1944, 39 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 899, 922–23 (1945).
The next major development in campaign finance law—the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA)—focused on candidates and parties generally rather than particular sources of campaign funds, but one provision proved to be quite significant for labor and business campaign participation. In the decades after the enactment of Taft-Hartley, labor unions continued to use PACs to engage in elections, but they relied on the uncertain legal foundation that the ban on union campaign spending did not apply to labor PACs because they used only voluntary union member contributions rather than union treasury funds. FECA resolved the issue by providing that a union may establish a “separate, segregated fund”—that is, a PAC—which can spend money in federal elections. The union can use its own funds to pay the costs of administering the PAC and raising funds for it, select the PAC’s personnel, and determine the PAC’s campaign spending decisions. But as long as the PAC uses only funds voluntarily donated for campaign spending rather than union treasury funds, PAC electoral activity is permitted.33
52 U.S.C. § 30118 (b)(2)(c).
Id.
52 U.S.C. § 30118(b)(4)(A)(i), (ii). The law provides a limited opportunity for a twice-yearly solicitation of contributions by a corporate PAC from all its employees and their families, and by a union PAC of corporate executives and administrative personnel and their shareholders. Id. at § 30118(b)(4)(B), (5).
52 U.S.C. § 30116 (1), (2).
Federal Elec. Comm’n Summary of PAC Activity, January 1, 2021 - December 31, 2022, (Mar. 6, 2023), https://perma.cc/2723-D7WE (there were 1,655 corporate PACs, 720 trade association PACs, and 309 membership PACs, compared with 271 labor PACs).
In Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United States,38
Pipefitters Loc. Union No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385 (1972).
Id. at 416. FECA included other provisions exempting corporations and unions from the statutory limitations on their campaign spending. The law authorizes “communications by a corporation to its stockholders and executive or administrative personnel and their families or by a labor organization to its members and families on any subject.” 52 U.S.C. § 30118(b)(2)(A). This essentially codified the decision of the Supreme Court in United States v. Cong. of Indus. Orgs., 335 U.S. 106 (1948), finding that applying Taft-Hartley’s spending ban to corporate and union communications to their own members would create the “gravest doubt” as to the measure’s constitutionality, id. at 121, and so reading the law not to apply to such “internal communications.” FECA authorized the expenditure of corporate and union treasury funds on nonpartisan voter registration and get-out-the-vote campaigns aimed at, respectively, stockholders and executive and administrative personnel and their families, and union members and their families. 52 U.S.C. § 30118 (b)(2)(B). The Act also created a media exception that excludes any news story, commentary, or editorial by a newspaper, periodical or broadcaster from the definition of “expenditure.” 52 U.S.C. § 30101(9)(B)(i). The exemption does not apply if the broadcaster, newspaper, or periodical is owned by a political party, political committee, or candidate.
Pipefitters, 407 U.S. at 421.
The final step in the evolution of the federal statutes governing corporate electoral activity was the enactment of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA).41
Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002).
See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 132 (2003).
Id. at 189–209.
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. at 365–66.
i. The pre-Buckley Era
Scarcely any cases dealt with restrictions on corporate campaign activity in the seventy years between the enactment of the Tillman Act and the birth of modern campaign finance jurisprudence in Buckley v. Valeo. Courts treated corporations as artificial creatures with powers limited to the business purposes spelled out in their charters, so that corporate campaign activity was considered ultra vires.45
See, e.g., People ex rel. Perkins v. Moss, 187 N.Y. 410, 423 (N.Y. 1907); McConnell v. Combination Min. & Mill. Co., 76 P. 194, 199 (Mont. 1904).
United States v. U.S. Brewers’ Ass’n, 239 F. 163, 168–69 (W.D. Pa. 1916).
Id. at 168.
United States v. Lewis Food Co., 366 F.2d 710, 712–13 (9th Cir. 1966).
In the pre-Buckley era, the Supreme Court discussed the restrictions on corporate campaign money only in cases dealing with unions. In United States v. CIO,49
Cong. of Indus. Orgs., 335 U.S. 106 (1948).
Id. at 121-24.
Id. at 154.
Id. at 154–55 (citing Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936)).
Id. at 154.
United States v. Auto Workers54
United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567 (1957).
Id. at 571.
Id. at 570.
Id. at 582.
Id. at 590–93.
Id. at 593.
ii. The Buckley Era
Buckley v. Valeo transformed campaign finance jurisprudence. The Court held for the first time that raising and spending campaign money is protected by the First Amendment’s freedoms of speech and association. The Court determined that (i) campaign spending, in contrast to campaign contributions, enjoys the highest level of constitutional protection;60
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44–45 (1976).
Id. at 48–49.
Id. at 26–27.
Id.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 21.
Two years after Buckley, in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,66
First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
Id. at 777 n.12.
Id. at 776–77.
Second, the Court expressed skepticism about, without flatly rejecting, the traditional argument for the corporate ban that corporate spending threatens the integrity of democratic elections. The Court agreed that the state’s argument that campaign spending by “wealthy and powerful” corporations can “drown out other points of view” and thereby undermine active citizen participation and public confidence in government would be worthy of consideration, but only if there were “record or legislative findings that corporate advocacy threatened imminently to undermine democratic processes . . . .”69
Id. at 789.
Id. at 789–90.
Id. at 790.
Id.at 791 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976)).
Third, the Court gave short shrift to the other major longstanding justification for barring corporate spending—protecting the interests of shareholders. Although shareholder protection is “an interest that is both legitimate and traditionally within the province of state law[,]” the corporate spending ban was both overinclusive—it would apply even if all shareholders approved spending—and underinclusive, as it applied only to electioneering and not lobbying, and only to corporations and not other organizations, such as business trusts or unions.73
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 792–95.
Bellotti’s reasoning called into question special restrictions on corporate campaign money, but the Court did not clearly rule out such special restrictions. Bellotti involved a referendum, not an election in which a candidate could be “corrupted,” a point the Court acknowledged in a footnote distinguishing the Massachusetts provision from the “many other state and federal laws regulating corporate participation in partisan candidate elections.”74
Id. at 788 n.26.
Id.
Still, the tenor of the opinion—its focus on the speech not the speaker, its dismissal of the traditional concerns about aggregations of corporate wealth and misuse of shareholder funds—did not bode well for the future of the bans on corporate campaign money. Yet, in five cases over the next two decades, the Court repeatedly sustained special restrictions on corporate campaign finance, repeatedly invoking the traditional arguments about corporate wealth and dissenting shareholders.
Just four years after Bellotti, a unanimous Supreme Court, in FEC v. National Right to Work Committee (NRWC),76
FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm. (NRWC), 459 U.S. 197 (1982).
Id. at 199–206.
Id. at 207–10.
Id. at 208–10.
Four years later, in FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL),80
FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL), 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
[n]ot an indication of popular support for the corporation’s political ideas. They reflect instead the economically motivated decisions of investors and customers. The availability of these resources may make a corporation a formidable political presence, even though the power of the corporation may be no reflection of the power of its ideas.81
81Id. at 258.
In the end, the majority determined that these concerns did not apply to MCFL, an ideological non-profit. MCFL did not engage in business activities or amass capital in the economic marketplace; its funds came entirely from people who supported the organization’s views. MCFL donors had no economic stake in the corporation that would discourage them from disassociating from it if they disagreed with its electioneering. Nor did MCFL accept any business donations, so there was no danger that business corporations were using it as a conduit.82
Four justices would have applied the spending ban to MCFL, contending that, as in NRWC, the Court should defer to Congress’s judgment that spending enabled by the corporate form necessarily threatens the political process. Id. at 266–71.
In 1990, in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,83
Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Com., 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
Id. at 658–60.
Id. at 660.
Id. at 660-61.
Id.
Id. at 661.
Id. at 659.
Subsequently, in FEC v. Beaumont,90
FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003).
Id. at 154.
Id. at 155.
Id. at 154 (quoting FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm. (NRWC), 459 U.S. 197, 208 (1982)).
Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 155.
Id. at 160.
Beaumont also determined that Buckley’s lower standard of review for contribution restrictions should apply even though the Tillman Act imposes a flat ban on corporations, not just a dollar limitation. The Court explained that the standard of review was “based on the importance of the ‘political activity at issue’ to effective speech or political association.”96
Id. at 161 (quoting FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life (MCFL), 479 U.S. 238, 259 (1986)).
Id. at 161.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976).
Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 163.
Shortly after, in McConnell v. FEC,100
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
Id. at 203–09.
Id. at 115–17.
Id. at 203–05.
Id. at 203.
iii. Citizens United
Seven years later in Citizens United v. FEC,105
558 U.S. 310 (2010).
Id. at 337–39.
Id. at 351.
Id. at 349–53.
Id. at 358–60.
In two short paragraphs, Citizens United also dismissed the dissenting shareholder justification for limiting corporate campaign spending. “[P]otential disagreement” within a corporation could not give the government the power to ban campaign speech.110
Id. at 361–62.
Notwithstanding Citizens United, over the last fourteen years multiple courts have sustained federal and state corporate contribution bans in cases involving ideological nonprofit advocacy corporations,111
See, e.g., Cath. Leadership Coal. of Tex. v. Reisman, 764 F.3d 409 (5th Cir. 2014); Iowa Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Tooker, 717 F.3d 576 (8th Cir. 2013); Minn. Citizens for Life, Inc., 692 F.3d 864 (8th Cir. 2012).
United States v. Emmons, 8 F.4th 454 (6th Cir. 2021); 1A Auto, Inc. v. Dir. of Off. of Campaign & Pol. Fin., 105 N.E.3d 1175 (Mass. 2018).
Yamada v. Snipes, 786 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 2015); United States v. Danielczyk, 683 F.3d 611 (4th Cir. 2012).
Lower courts must continue to follow governing Supreme Court precedent even if that precedent has been conceptually undermined by a later Supreme Court case.114
See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 207 (1997) (“lower courts should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions”).
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 377 (2010).
Id. at 380.
See Lundergan v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2676 (2022); 1A Auto, Inc. v. Dir. of Off. of Campaigns & Pol. Fin., 139 S. Ct. 2613 (2019); Iowa Right to Life, Inc. v. Tooker, 134 S. Ct. 1787 (2014); Danielczyk v. United States, 568 U.S. 1193 (2013); Ognibene v. Parkes, 567 U.S. 935 (2012); Green Party of Conn. v. Lange, 564 U.S. 1052 (2011).
Moreover, these courts have found that at least some of Beaumont’s reasoning continues to survive as well. To be sure, one strand of Beaumont’s analysis invoked Austin’s concern with corporate “war-chest corruption,”118
FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 154–55 (2003).
Id. at 155–56.
Id. at 155.
Id. at 154–55.
The prevention of quid pro quo corruption and its appearance continues to be the fundamental basis for contribution restrictions, and surely corporate contributions, like contributions from individuals, raise the possibility, or the appearance, of the exchange of donations for political favors. As the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court emphasized, “[b]oth history and common sense have demonstrated that when corporations make contributions to political candidates, there is a risk of corruption, both actual and perceived.”122
1A Auto, Inc. v. Dir. of Off. of Campaign & Pol. Fin., 105 N.E.3d 1175, 1187 (Mass. 2018).
Beaumont was the first corporate limitation case to rely on the anti-circumvention justification, but the argument that some limits on campaign money are justified to prevent the evasion of previously-accepted limits had been sustained in cases involving the limitation of donations to and spending by political parties,123
See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003); FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 456–57, n.18 (2001).
Cal, Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 198 (1981).
United States v. Danielczyk, 683 F.3d 611, 618–19 (4th Cir. 2012).
Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, 645 F.3d 1109, 1124 (9th Cir. 2011).
United States v. Emmons, 8 F.4th 454, 469 (6th Cir. 2021).
Given the ease with which an individual can create a corporation, donors who hit the limit on individual donations could funnel additional contributions through corporations created for that purpose. A single individual could generate multiple corporations that he or she controls and can use to end-run the cap on donations. Dollar limits on individual donations to a candidate could be rendered meaningless if the individual could proliferate new corporations, each of which could separately donate to the same candidate.
Corporate contributions could also facilitate the circumvention of disclosure requirements by enabling a donor to disguise his role in a campaign by creating and putting money in a corporation that contributes to a candidate. In Western Tradition Partnership (WTP), the Montana Supreme Court found that WTP -- despite the word “partnership” in its name, the entity is a corporation — was created “to act as a conduit of funds for persons and entities including corporations who want to spend money anonymously to influence Montana elections.”128
W. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Att’y Gen. of State, 271 P.3d 1, 4 (Mont. 2011).
See, e.g., Robert Maguire & Viveca Novak, Exclusive: Largest Dark Money Donor Groups Share Funds, Hide Links, OpenSecrets (Sept. 10, 2013), https://perma.cc/747J-SYXV.
As Ann Ravel, the then-chair of California’s Fair Political Practices Commission (FPPC) and subsequently chair of the FEC, observed, “people are willing to use circuitous routes to avoid telling the voters who is behind campaigns.”130
Matea Gold & Tom Hamburger, California Donor Disclosure Case Exposes How Nonprofit Groups Can Play in Politics, Wash. Post (Nov. 4, 2013), https://perma.cc/25D5-SX2V.
See Nicholas Confessore, Group Linked to Kochs Admits to Campaign Finance Violations, N.Y. Times (Oct. 24, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/25/us/politics/group-linked-to-kochs-admits-to-campaign-finance-violations.html.
Gold & Hamburger, supra note 130.
W. Tradition P’ship, 271 P.3d at 7.
Shareholder protection is the most uncertain of the remaining Beaumont justifications. Citizens United dismissed that argument as clearly inadequate to justify a ban on corporate independent spending, but the Court’s brief discussion of the shareholder-protection rationale did not consider whether that argument would receive more weight in the context of a restriction on corporate contributions.134
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 361–62 (2010).
See, e.g., 1A Auto, Inc. v. Dir. of Off. of Campaign & Pol. Fin., 105 N.E.3d 1175, 1183 (Mass. 2018).
See, e.g., United States v. Danielczyk, 683 F.3d 611, 618 (4th Cir. 2012); Ognibene v. Parkes, 671 F.3d 174, 195 n.21 (2d Cir. 2011); Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, 645 F.3d 1109, 1125 (9th Cir. 2011).
Shareholder protection has been a justification for limiting corporate spending at least since the revelations of the Armstrong Committee.137
See supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text.
FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 208 (1982).
FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 154–55 (2003).
Nor is shareholder protection rooted in the war chest theory of corruption disavowed in Citizens United. That theory was a post-Buckley attempt to preserve the concern that, since the late nineteenth century, has driven efforts to limit corporate electoral participation—that deployment of corporate economic power in the political realm is inherently a threat to the integrity of democratic elections. Buckley’s rejection of wealth inequality as a justification for limiting spending, coupled with Citizen United’s dismissal of the role of “state-created advantages” in empowering corporations means that argument is no longer doctrinally available. Shareholder protection, however, is not based on a theory of state-supported corporate power with respect to elections, but is instead concerned about the protection of shareholders within the corporate framework. Indeed, Citizens United’s recharacterization of a corporation as an “association[] of citizens”140
558 U.S. at 354, 356.
Id. at 362 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978)).
Although ruled out as a basis for banning corporate spending, shareholder protection may still be a sufficiently substantial justification for limiting corporate contributions given the less stringent standard of review applicable to contribution restrictions. Yet, even if the justification remains a substantial one, a ban may still be challenged as not “closely drawn” to achieving the shareholder-protection goal.
Assuming quid pro quo corruption and its appearance, anti-circumvention, and shareholder-protection are substantial government concerns that could justify a ban on corporate contributions, the question becomes whether a ban is “closely drawn,”142
McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 197–98 (2014) (citing and quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25, 26–27, 29 (1976)).
Citizens United ameliorated the burden created by the corporate contribution ban by authorizing corporate independent spending. At least two of the post-Citizens United lower courts that upheld corporate contribution bans have pointed to the availability of independent spending. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court concluded that the state’s ban on corporate contributions is “not ‘a complete ban’” because, due to Citizens United, Massachusetts permits corporations to engage in a significant form of political expression that was not allowed when Beaumont was decided—unlimited independent expenditures.143
See 1A Auto, Inc. v. Dir. of Off. of Campaign & Pol. Fin., 105 N.E.3d 1188 (Mass. 2018).
Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, 645 F.3d 1109, 1125 (9th Cir. 2011).
It can be argued that a contribution ban, like the Tillman Act, is not closely drawn given the availability of a less constitutionally burdensome alternative—dollar limits, like FECA places on individual contributions. That would be a persuasive argument if the only justifications for the corporate contribution ban are the prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption from corporate donations. However, a limit may not be as effective as a ban at attaining the other reasons the Court recognized in Beaumont—anti-circumvention and shareholder protection. Even small corporate contributions would undermine the anti-circumvention goal by allowing donors who have “maxed out” on their individual contributions to make additional contributions through corporations. Similarly, even small corporate donations would conflict with the interests of dissenting shareholders. A ban, rather than a dollar limit, is closely drawn to protect these interests.
Citizens United suggested that disclosure may be a less burdensome means of protecting the dissenting shareholder interest: “[P]rompt disclosure of expenditures can provide shareholders and citizens with the information needed to hold corporations and elected officials accountable for their positions and supporters.”145
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 370–71 (2010) (internal citations omitted).
See Center for Political Accountability, 2023 CPA-Zicklin Index of Corporate Political Disclosure and Accountability (Oct. 31, 2023), https://perma.cc/F789-7WUW (study of campaign spending practices of companies in S&P 500 Index and the Russell 1000 Index).
Id. at 14 (78% of the Russell 1000 companies not in the S&P 500 provided no disclosure of their donations to state and local candidates and parties). See also Sarah C. Haan, Shareholder Proposal Settlements and the Private Ordering of Public Elections, 126 Yale L. J. 262 (2016).
See Haan, supra note 147, at 303–04 (discussing the limited and “highly fragmented” nature of corporate political disclosure).
It is unclear how useful disclosure would be to shareholders. Voluntary corporate disclosures are not timed to elections,149
See 2023 CPA-Zicklin Index, supra note 146, at 37, 39 (giving highest score to companies that report semiannually and partial positive score to companies that report annually). See also id. (giving full credit to companies that provide their political disclosures on an easily accessible dedicated webpage and partial credit to a company that “has a dedicated political webpage [that] is somewhat difficult to find”).
See, e.g., Investment Company Institute, Majority of American Households Rely on Mutual Funds to Save and Invest (Nov. 1, 2023), https://perma.cc/CBF4-L5XE.
Nor would disclosure necessarily give shareholders a voice with respect to contribution decisions. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has required public companies subject to its jurisdiction to place shareholder-initiated resolutions concerning company political spending on the annual meeting proxy statements for a shareholder vote.151
Shareholder Proposal Submitted by Home Depot to NorthStar Asset Management Funded Pension Plan, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (Mar. 25, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2011/northstarasset032511-14a8.pdf.
See Thomas W. Joo, Corporate Governance and the Constitutionality of Campaign Finance Reform, 1 Election L. J. 361, 367–68 (2002).
IV. Shifting Standards: Implications from Evolving Campaign Finance Doctrine for the Corporate Contribution Ban
TOPIn the fourteen years since Citizens United, the Supreme Court has confirmed its skepticism about campaign finance regulation in ways that could ultimately spell the end of the corporate contribution ban.
In McCutcheon v. FEC,153
McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185 (2014).
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 38 (1976).
McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 200–03.
Id. at 203–18.
Id. at 221–23.
The Court’s rigorous probing of the anti-circumvention argument, its unwillingness to defer to the judgment of Congress and the FEC about whether and how donors and politicians with the incentive to evade contribution restrictions would be able to do so, and its reliance on untested hypothetical alternatives all cast doubt on the continued force of the anti-circumvention justification. The Chief Justice’s rhetoric in particular underscored his doubts about whether anti-circumvention is a constitutionally sufficient justification for campaign finance regulation. In the Chief Justice’s words, the individual-to-candidate contribution limits “themselves are a prophylactic measure.”158
Id. at 221.
Id. (citations omitted).
More subtly, McCutcheon hinted that the traditionally less exacting standard of review for contribution restrictions may be up for reconsideration. Chief Justice Roberts opened his analysis by referring to the “significant energy” spent by the parties and amici “debating whether the line that Buckley drew between contributions and expenditures should remain the law.”160
McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 199.
Id.
Id. at 223–27.
Id. at 206–07.
Id. at 223.
The 2022 decision in FEC v. Ted Cruz for Senate165
FEC v. Cruz, 596 U.S. 289 (2022).
Id. at 314.
Nonetheless, the Court determined the measure violated the First Amendment. As in McCutcheon, the Court mused about the debate between the parties over whether to apply strict scrutiny or “closely drawn” review before deciding there was no need to resolve the issue—or reaffirm Buckley on this point—because the law failed both standards.167
Id. at 305.
Id. at 302–05.
Id. at 305 (citations omitted).
As in McCutcheon, the Court focused on the fact that the contributions restricted by the post-election repayment rule are subject to FECA’s dollar limits: “[i]ndividual contributions to candidates for federal office, including those made after a candidate has won the election, are already regulated in order to prevent corruption or its appearance.”170
Id. at 306.
Cruz, 596 U.S. at 306.
Id. at 311. The dissent argued that the government and amici had presented ample evidence of such corruption. Id. at 323–27.
Id. at 308–13.
Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta (AFP)174
Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 594 U.S. 595 (2021).
Id.at 600-02.
The central question for the Court was the standard of review. In elections cases, including campaign finance cases, the Court had held that the standard of review of disclosure requirements was “exacting scrutiny,” that is, that “there must be a substantial relation between the disclosure requirement and a sufficiently important government interest.”176
Id. at 607.
Id.
The Court did not move all the way to least restrictive means but it did require that the disclosure regulations be “narrowly tailored” to the government’s interest,178
Id. at 608–11
Id. at 611–19
Id. at 618.
AFP is not a campaign finance case. Conceivably, as the plaintiffs’ acknowledged, the government interest in campaign finance disclosure is stronger.181
Id. at 607.
Id. at 609.
What could replace the corporate contribution ban if it were struck down? This Part explores three possibilities. None would really replace the ban, but each could address some of the concerns that have justified the ban.
One approach is to build on the “pay-to-play” laws that restrict donations from government contractors or other entities that have especially close relationships with government. By one count, fifteen states and multiple local governments either prohibit or tightly limit campaign contributions by, or impose enhanced disclosure requirements on, entities that hold or bid for government contracts and individuals closely associated with them.183
See Craig Holman & Kyung Rok Wi, Pay-to-Play Restrictions on Campaign Contributions from Government Contractors, 2016, Public Citizen, https://perma.cc/7PW3-TFLR.
Wagner v. FEC, 793 F.3d 1 (D.C. 2015), cert. den. sub nom. Miller v. FEC, 577 U.S. 1102 (2016).
Id. at 8.
Id. at 14–21.
Id. at 22.
Unlike the corruption risk when a contribution is made by a member of the general public, in the case of contracting there is a very specific quo for which the contribution may serve as the quid . . . . Moreover, because of that sharpened focus, the appearance problem is also greater: a contribution made while negotiating or performing a contract looks like a quid pro quo, whether or not it truly is.188
188Id.
Other courts that sustained contractor contribution bans or very low limits on contractor donations also relied on histories of corrupt arrangements between contractors and public officials to sustain their determinations that the restrictions were closely drawn to achieve an important government interest.189
See, e.g., Yamada v. Snipes, 786 F.3d 1182, 1204–07 (9th Cir. 2015); Ognibene v. Parkes, 671 F.3d 174, 182–93 (2d Cir. 2011); Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 616 F.3d 189, 199–205 (2d Cir. 2010).
See Dallman v. Ritter, 225 P.3d 610 (Colo. 2010).
To be sure, Wagner also relied heavily on Beaumont, as have other appellate court decisions sustaining state laws banning contributions by government contractors.191
See, e.g., Green Party of Conn., 616 F.3d; Yamada, 786 F.3d.
Green Party of Conn., 616 F.3d at 194 (Connecticut contractor contribution ban applies to any “person, business entity or nonprofit corporation that enters into a state contract”); Yamada, 786 F.3d at 1204 (Hawaii contractor contribution ban applies to “any person” who enters into a contract with the state or other specified governmental entities).
At the federal level, additional pay-to-play rules have been applied to certain participants in the municipal finance industry. Rule G-37 of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, adopted in 1994, prohibits brokers, dealers, or municipal securities dealers from engaging in municipal securities business with an issuer within two years of making a campaign contribution to an official of the issuer who can influence the awarding of municipal securities business.193
59 Fed. Reg. 17621 (Apr. 13, 1994). The rule has an exemption permitting a contribution of up to $250 to any official for whom the donor is eligible to vote. Id.
See 81 Fed. Reg. 60053/1, 60057/2 (placement agents) 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)95(a)(i) (investment advisers). The rules permit a contribution of $350 to a candidate for whom the donor is eligible to vote, and a $150 contribution to other candidates.
In Blount v. SEC,195
61 F.3d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
Id. at 944–45.
Id. at 947.
Id. at 947–48.
927 F.3d 499 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
Id. at 510–11.
Some states have applied the pay-to-play model to donations from certain industries, such as those associated with vice like alcohol,201
Schiller Park Colonial Inn, Inc. v. Benz, 349 N.E.2d 611 (Ill. 1976).
See, e.g., Casino Ass’n of La. v. Foster, 820 So.2d 494 (La. 2002); Soto v. N.J., 565 A.2d 1088 (N.J. 1989). But see Deon v. Barasch, 960 F.3d 152 (3d Cir. 2020) (finding not closely drawn a Pennsylvania law preventing individuals holding interests in businesses with gaming licenses from making political contributions).
Ball v. Madigan, 245 F.Supp.3d 1004 (N.D. Ill 2017) (finding Illinois law banning medical cannabis cultivation centers and dispensers from making campaign contributions not closely drawn).
See Gwinn v. State Ethics Comm’n, 426 S.E.2d 890 (Ga. 1993).
See N.J. Bankers Ass’n v. Grewal, 2021 WL 2525762 (D.N.J. 2021).
Compare Deon, 960 F.3d, with Casino Ass’n, 820 So.2d. See also Ball, 245 F.Supp.3d at 1016 (calling into question the 1976 Illinois Supreme Court decision in Schiller Park, 349 N.E.2d).
State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597, 619 (Ak. 1999). Accord Preston v. Leake, 660 F.3d 726, 737 (4th Cir. 2011); Schickel v. Dilger, 925 F.3d 858, 871 (6th Cir. 2019) (“history confirms that contributions from lobbyists, their employers, and PACs as well as gifts from lobbyists, suggest quid pro quo corruption”). Accord Inst. of Governmental Advocs. v. Fair Pol. Pracs. Comm’n, 164 F.Supp.2d 1183, 1194 (E.D. Cal. 2001) (lobbyists’ contributions present a special danger of corruption because their “continued employment depends on their success in influencing legislative action”).
Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 616 F.3d 189, 206 (2010). But cf Ognibene v. Parkes, 671 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2011) (upholding New York City law sharply lowering the permissible limit on contributions by lobbyists as part of broader restriction on contributions to city officials by persons doing business with the city).
Pay-to-play restrictions are far from a complete replacement of a corporate contribution ban. Most corporations are not government contractors or participants in distinctly highly regulated industries. Moreover, pay-to-play restrictions rely on Buckley’s less-than-strict scrutiny of contribution restrictions, which is increasingly uncertain.209
But cf. Blount v. SEC, 61 F.3d 938, 944–48 (MSRB Rule 37-G survives strict scrutiny). Subsequently, in N.Y. State Republican State Comm. v SEC, the D.C. Circuit applied the less exacting “closely drawn” standard instead of strict scrutiny. 927 F.3d at 511–12.
Citizens United made a point of saying that it did not reach the question of whether there is a compelling government interest “in preventing foreign individuals or associations from influencing our Nation’s political process.”210
558 U.S. 310, 362 (2010).
565 U.S. 1104 (2012).
Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281 (2011).
The Federal Election Campaign Act prohibits a “foreign national” from directly making a contribution in connection with a federal, state, or local election. 52 U.S.C. § 30121(a). The Act’s definition of a “foreign national’ includes an individual who is not a citizen of the United States and a “foreign principal” which, in turn, includes a corporation “organized under the laws or having its principal place of business in a foreign country.” 52 U.S.C. § 30121(b). See also 11 C.F.R. § 110.20(a)(3).
See 11 C.F.R. § 110.20(i). This provision also bars foreign nationals from “involvement in the management of a political committee.” See FEC, Contribution Limits and Prohibitions, 67 Fed. Reg. 69928, 69946 (Nov. 19, 2002). See generally, Ellen L. Weintraub, Draft Interpretive Rule Concerning Prohibited Activities Involving Foreign Nationals, Federal Election Commission (Sept. 26, 2019), https://perma.cc/H8LQ-YGUL.
Some states and local governments have sought to fill the gap with laws addressing foreign corporate spending in their elections.215
See, e.g., Jason Abel, Adie J. Olson & Elizabeth Goodwin, Growing List of States and Localities Prohibit Foreign Political Spending, Steptoe (Jan. 5, 2024), https://perma.cc/7Z9Z-QHHD; Ki Hong & Sam Rothbloom, States and Localities Take on Foreign-Influenced Political Spending, Reuters (May 30, 2023), https://www.reuters.com/legal/legalindustry/states-localities-take-foreign-influenced-political-spending-2023-05-30/.
See, e.g., Greg Scruggs, Seattle Passes Campaign Finance Curbs on ‘Foreign-Influenced’ Firms, Reuters (Jan. 13, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-politics-seattle/seattle-passes-campaign-finance-curbs-on-foreign-influenced-firms-idUSKBN1ZD04T/ (“The Seattle City Council voted unanimously on Monday to approve campaign finance legislation banning political donations in local elections from companies with at least 5% foreign ownership.”); San Jose Bans City Election Contributions from Multinational Corporations, Ojai Valley News, (Dec. 13, 2023), https://perma.cc/7LPE-4N8B (“The new city legislation will prohibit corporations from spending money in San Jose’s elections if they are foreign-influenced, defined as 1 percent or more ownership by a single foreign investor or five percent or more ownership by multiple foreign investors.”).
Minn. Stat. § 211B.15
In December 2023, a federal district court issued a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the Minnesota law.218
Minn. Chamber of Com. v. Choi, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2023 WL 8803357 (D. Minn. Dec. 20, 2023).
Id. at *7.
In February 2024, the Maine federal district court issued a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of that state’s recently adopted ban on campaign spending by “foreign government-influenced” entities.220
Central Me. Power Co. v. Me. Comm’n on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2024 WL 866367 (D. Me. Feb. 29, 2024).
Id. at *2.
Id. at *12. The court assumed without deciding that limiting foreign government interest in referendum elections is also a compelling government interest. Id. The court also found that FECA preempted the application of the state law to federal elections but that it did not prohibit state regulation of foreign government campaign expenditures in state and local candidate elections or referenda. Id. at *5–11.
The five percent foreign ownership threshold was overbroad. It “would prohibit a substantial amount of protected speech” and seemed “arbitrarily chosen.”223
Id. at *13–14. The court left open the possibility that during discovery the state could provide evidence of foreign government influence over campaign spending by domestic entities with only a small ownership share. Id. at *14.
Id. at *15. The court had found the ban on foreign government campaign participation narrowly tailored to the state’s interest, id. at *13, but concluded that at least at the preliminary injunction stage that provision could not be severed from the rest of the law. Id. at *16.
These two decisions are certainly not the last word in the effort to regulate foreign or foreign-influenced corporations. But they confirm that although in principle foreign corporations can be barred from participating in United States elections, defining what makes a corporation foreign is far from clear and that aggressive efforts to find define foreign influence risk being struck down as an excessive restriction on corporate election participation.
Citizens United placed great weight on disclosure as the appropriate means of regulating corporate participation in elections, contending that “disclosure permits citizens and shareholders to react to the speech of corporate entities in a proper way. This transparency enables the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to different speakers and messages.”225
558 U.S. 310, 371 (2010).
See supra notes 145–52 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 146–47 and accompanying text.
See Haan, supra note 147.
In 2011, the Committee on Disclosure of Corporate Political Spending submitted a petition for rulemaking to the SEC asking “that the Commission develop rules to require public companies to disclose to shareholders the use of corporate resources for political activities.”229
Letter from Commission on Disclosure of Corporate Political Spending to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (Aug. 3, 2011), https://perma.cc/4QL8-P8P6.
Bebchuk et al., The Untenable Case for Keeping Investors in the Dark, 10 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 1, 3 (2020).
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023, Pub. L. No. 117-328, § 633, 136 Stat. 4459, 4703 (2022). The same wording was included in the 2017 and 2018 versions of the Act. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-31, § 635, 131 Stat. 135, 376 (2017); Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141, § 631, 132 Stat. 348, 584 (2018). The 2016 version had slightly different wording. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 707, 129 Stat. 2242, 3029-3030 (2015) (“None of the funds made available by any division of this Act shall be used by the Securities and Exchange Commission to finalize, issue, or implement any rule, regulation, or order regarding the disclosure of political contributions, contributions to tax exempt organizations, or dues paid to trade associations.”).
Government-mandated disclosure would also raise constitutional issues. The Supreme Court has consistently supported campaign finance disclosure, including, most prominently, in Citizens United itself.232
558 U.S. 310, 366–71 (2010).
See supra notes 174–82 and accompanying text.
Given the Congressional blockade against SEC action on corporate disclosure, it would be premature, and well beyond the scope of this article, to consider the constitutional issues that would be raised by a corporate contribution disclosure requirement. Suffice it to say that at least in the near term, disclosure is unlikely to be an effective replacement for the corporate contribution ban should that ban be held unconstitutional.
What accounts for the surprising survival—so far—of the corporate contribution ban? It is a mystery. The corporate contribution ban is almost entirely out-of-sync with modern campaign finance doctrine. Corporations, recharacterized as “associations of citizens,”234
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 354, 356 (2010).
For most corporations, it may not matter. Given the availability of both the PAC option and independent spending—along with issue advocacy, general voter education campaigns, and lobbying—corporations have ample opportunities to make their interests known and their voices heard in the political process.
However, this is not a completely satisfactory answer. As Citizens United pointed out, setting up a PAC entails administrative costs and requires the solicitation of donations from corporate personnel.235
See id. at 337–38.
Nor is it clear why the Supreme Court has declined to address the issue. The Court has denied certiorari in at least six corporate contribution cases since 2010.236
See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
In addition to McCutcheon and Cruz, discussed in the text, the only other campaign finance decided by the Court in the last fourteen years is Thompson v. Hebdon, 589 U.S. 1 (2019), a brief per curiam decision vacating and remanding a Ninth Circuit decision affirming a lower court’s dismissal of Alaska’s contribution limits. The case broke no new ground, finding only that the lower courts had failed to adequately consider the Court’s earlier decision in Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006), in assessing the Alaska contribution limits.
On the other hand, this would likely not be a hard issue for the current Court. In the nearly two decades since Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito joined the Court, the Court has consistently ruled against every challenged campaign finance rule—federal or state, statute or regulation. Two of those cases, Citizens United and McCutcheon, overruled campaign finance precedents, so Beaumont would not be much of a barrier to action if the Court decided to take up the issue.
So, judicial inaction remains a mystery, and the corporate contribution ban surprisingly continues to survive—for now.
- 1See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
- 2See, e.g., FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 207 (1982).
- 3Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 349, 354, 356.
- 4Id. at 364–65.
- 5See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14–23 (1976).
- 6Id. at 20 (a contribution limit “entails only a marginal restriction upon the contributor’s ability to engage in free communication”).
- 7See, e.g., Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006); McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185 (2014); FEC v. Cruz, 596 U.S. 289 (2022). See also Thompson v. Hebdon, 589 U.S. 1 (2019) (vacating and remanding lower court decision dismissing challenge to state’s contribution limits).
- 8Nat’l Conf. State Legislatures, State Limits on Contributions to Candidates, 2023-2024 Election Cycle, (last updated May 2023), https://perma.cc/T4AU-9YDR.
- 9See, e.g., United States v. Emmons, 8 F.4th 454 (6th Cir. 2021); 1A Auto, Inc. v. Dir. of Off. of Campaign & Pol. Fin, 105 N.E.3d 1175 (Mass. 2018); Yamada v. Snipes, 786 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 2015); Cath. Leadership Coal. of Texas v. Reisman, 764 F.3d 409, 441–45 (5th Cir. 2014); Iowa Right To Life Comm., Inc. v. Tooker, 717 F.3d 576 (8th Cir. 2013); Minnesota Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, 692 F.3d 864 (8th Cir. 2012) (en banc); United States v. Danielczyk, 683 F.3d 611 (4th Cir. 2012); Ognibene v. Parkes, 671 F.3d 174 (2d. Cir. 2011); Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, 645 F.3d 1109, 1124–26 (9th Cir. 2011); Green Party of Connecticut v. Garfield, 616 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2010).
- 10FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003).
- 11See, e.g., Cruz, 598 U.S. at 306; McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 221; FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 479 (2007).
- 12Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 361–62.
- 13In his Fifth Annual Message to Congress, President Jackson reported that the Bank, a “great and powerful institution[,]” has been “actively engaged in attempting to influence the elections of the public officers by means of its money . . . .” Andrew Jackson, Fifth Annual Message, December 03, 1833, The Am. Presidency Project, https://perma.cc/6ZUK-U5JB (last visited Apr. 6, 2024). To combat this “electioneering engine,” the government would withdraw its deposits from the Bank:
In this point of the case the question is distinctly presented whether the people of the United States are to govern through representatives chosen by their unbiased suffrages or whether the money and power of a great corporation are to be secretly exerted to influence their judgment and control their decisions. It must now be determined whether the Bank is to have its candidates for all offices in the country, from the highest to the lowest, or whether candidates on both sides of political questions shall be brought forward as heretofore and supported by the usual means.
Id.
- 14See Adam Winkler, Citizens United, Personhood, and the Corporation in Politics, in Corporations and American Democracy 359, 368 (Naomi R. Lamoreaux & William J. Novak eds., 2017).
- 15See Margaret M. Blair & Elizabeth Pollman, The Supreme Court’s View of Corporate Rights: Two Centuries of Evolution and Controversy, in Corporations and American Democracy 245, 275 (Naomi R. Lamoreaux & William J. Novak eds., 2017).
- 16Ky. Const., § 159.
- 17Perry Belmont, Publicity of Election Expenditures, 180 The No. Am. Rev. 166, 176 (1905).
- 18Elihu Root, The Political Use of Money, September 3, 1894, in Addresses on Government and Citizenship 141, 143 (collected and edited by Robert Bacon & James Brown Scott, Harv. Univ. Press 1916).
- 19Id. at 144.
- 20See Winkler, supra note 14, at 359.
- 21Id.
- 22Theodore Roosevelt, Fifth Annual Message to Congress, December 05, 1905, The Am. Presidency Project, https://perma.cc/VSV3-KX7L (last visited Apr. 6, 2024).
- 23Theodore Roosevelt, Sixth Annual Message to Congress, December 03, 1906, The Am. Presidency Project, https://perma.cc/DSJ2-SKNX (last visited Apr. 6, 2024).
- 24Tillman Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864.
- 25Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, 43 Stat. 1070.
- 2652 U.S.C. § 30118(a).
- 27See Earl R. Sikes, State and Federal Corrupt-Practices Legislation 127–28 (1928).
- 28David J. Sousa, “No Balance in the Equities”: Union Power in the Making and Unmaking of the Campaign Finance Regime, 13 Stud. Am. Pol. Dev. 374, 380–83 (1999).
- 29Id. at 381–85.
- 30Pub. L. No. 78-89, 57 Stat. 163 (1943).
- 31Pub. L. No. 101-120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947). Many states adopted similar restrictions. Today, twenty states prohibit unions from contributing to candidates for state office. See Nat’l Conf. State Legislatures, supra note 8.
- 32See Louise Overacker, American Government and Politics: Presidential Campaign Funds, 1944, 39 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 899, 922–23 (1945).
- 3352 U.S.C. § 30118 (b)(2)(c).
- 34Id.
- 3552 U.S.C. § 30118(b)(4)(A)(i), (ii). The law provides a limited opportunity for a twice-yearly solicitation of contributions by a corporate PAC from all its employees and their families, and by a union PAC of corporate executives and administrative personnel and their shareholders. Id. at § 30118(b)(4)(B), (5).
- 3652 U.S.C. § 30116 (1), (2).
- 37Federal Elec. Comm’n Summary of PAC Activity, January 1, 2021 - December 31, 2022, (Mar. 6, 2023), https://perma.cc/2723-D7WE (there were 1,655 corporate PACs, 720 trade association PACs, and 309 membership PACs, compared with 271 labor PACs).
- 38Pipefitters Loc. Union No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385 (1972).
- 39Id. at 416. FECA included other provisions exempting corporations and unions from the statutory limitations on their campaign spending. The law authorizes “communications by a corporation to its stockholders and executive or administrative personnel and their families or by a labor organization to its members and families on any subject.” 52 U.S.C. § 30118(b)(2)(A). This essentially codified the decision of the Supreme Court in United States v. Cong. of Indus. Orgs., 335 U.S. 106 (1948), finding that applying Taft-Hartley’s spending ban to corporate and union communications to their own members would create the “gravest doubt” as to the measure’s constitutionality, id. at 121, and so reading the law not to apply to such “internal communications.” FECA authorized the expenditure of corporate and union treasury funds on nonpartisan voter registration and get-out-the-vote campaigns aimed at, respectively, stockholders and executive and administrative personnel and their families, and union members and their families. 52 U.S.C. § 30118 (b)(2)(B). The Act also created a media exception that excludes any news story, commentary, or editorial by a newspaper, periodical or broadcaster from the definition of “expenditure.” 52 U.S.C. § 30101(9)(B)(i). The exemption does not apply if the broadcaster, newspaper, or periodical is owned by a political party, political committee, or candidate.
- 40Pipefitters, 407 U.S. at 421.
- 41Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002).
- 42See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 132 (2003).
- 43Id. at 189–209.
- 44Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. at 365–66.
- 45See, e.g., People ex rel. Perkins v. Moss, 187 N.Y. 410, 423 (N.Y. 1907); McConnell v. Combination Min. & Mill. Co., 76 P. 194, 199 (Mont. 1904).
- 46United States v. U.S. Brewers’ Ass’n, 239 F. 163, 168–69 (W.D. Pa. 1916).
- 47Id. at 168.
- 48United States v. Lewis Food Co., 366 F.2d 710, 712–13 (9th Cir. 1966).
- 49Cong. of Indus. Orgs., 335 U.S. 106 (1948).
- 50Id. at 121-24.
- 51Id. at 154.
- 52Id. at 154–55 (citing Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936)).
- 53Id. at 154.
- 54United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567 (1957).
- 55Id. at 571.
- 56Id. at 570.
- 57Id. at 582.
- 58Id. at 590–93.
- 59Id. at 593.
- 60Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44–45 (1976).
- 61Id. at 48–49.
- 62Id. at 26–27.
- 63Id.
- 64Id. at 47.
- 65Id. at 21.
- 66First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
- 67Id. at 777 n.12.
- 68Id. at 776–77.
- 69Id. at 789.
- 70Id. at 789–90.
- 71Id. at 790.
- 72Id.at 791 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976)).
- 73Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 792–95.
- 74Id. at 788 n.26.
- 75Id.
- 76FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm. (NRWC), 459 U.S. 197 (1982).
- 77Id. at 199–206.
- 78Id. at 207–10.
- 79Id. at 208–10.
- 80FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL), 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
- 81Id. at 258.
- 82Four justices would have applied the spending ban to MCFL, contending that, as in NRWC, the Court should defer to Congress’s judgment that spending enabled by the corporate form necessarily threatens the political process. Id. at 266–71.
- 83Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Com., 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
- 84Id. at 658–60.
- 85Id. at 660.
- 86Id. at 660-61.
- 87Id.
- 88Id. at 661.
- 89Id. at 659.
- 90FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003).
- 91Id. at 154.
- 92Id. at 155.
- 93Id. at 154 (quoting FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm. (NRWC), 459 U.S. 197, 208 (1982)).
- 94Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 155.
- 95Id. at 160.
- 96Id. at 161 (quoting FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life (MCFL), 479 U.S. 238, 259 (1986)).
- 97Id. at 161.
- 98Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976).
- 99Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 163.
- 100McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
- 101Id. at 203–09.
- 102Id. at 115–17.
- 103Id. at 203–05.
- 104Id. at 203.
- 105558 U.S. 310 (2010).
- 106Id. at 337–39.
- 107Id. at 351.
- 108Id. at 349–53.
- 109Id. at 358–60.
- 110Id. at 361–62.
- 111See, e.g., Cath. Leadership Coal. of Tex. v. Reisman, 764 F.3d 409 (5th Cir. 2014); Iowa Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Tooker, 717 F.3d 576 (8th Cir. 2013); Minn. Citizens for Life, Inc., 692 F.3d 864 (8th Cir. 2012).
- 112United States v. Emmons, 8 F.4th 454 (6th Cir. 2021); 1A Auto, Inc. v. Dir. of Off. of Campaign & Pol. Fin., 105 N.E.3d 1175 (Mass. 2018).
- 113Yamada v. Snipes, 786 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 2015); United States v. Danielczyk, 683 F.3d 611 (4th Cir. 2012).
- 114See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 207 (1997) (“lower courts should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions”).
- 115Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 377 (2010).
- 116Id. at 380.
- 117See Lundergan v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2676 (2022); 1A Auto, Inc. v. Dir. of Off. of Campaigns & Pol. Fin., 139 S. Ct. 2613 (2019); Iowa Right to Life, Inc. v. Tooker, 134 S. Ct. 1787 (2014); Danielczyk v. United States, 568 U.S. 1193 (2013); Ognibene v. Parkes, 567 U.S. 935 (2012); Green Party of Conn. v. Lange, 564 U.S. 1052 (2011).
- 118FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 154–55 (2003).
- 119Id. at 155–56.
- 120Id. at 155.
- 121Id. at 154–55.
- 1221A Auto, Inc. v. Dir. of Off. of Campaign & Pol. Fin., 105 N.E.3d 1175, 1187 (Mass. 2018).
- 123See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003); FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 456–57, n.18 (2001).
- 124Cal, Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 198 (1981).
- 125United States v. Danielczyk, 683 F.3d 611, 618–19 (4th Cir. 2012).
- 126Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, 645 F.3d 1109, 1124 (9th Cir. 2011).
- 127United States v. Emmons, 8 F.4th 454, 469 (6th Cir. 2021).
- 128W. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Att’y Gen. of State, 271 P.3d 1, 4 (Mont. 2011).
- 129See, e.g., Robert Maguire & Viveca Novak, Exclusive: Largest Dark Money Donor Groups Share Funds, Hide Links, OpenSecrets (Sept. 10, 2013), https://perma.cc/747J-SYXV.
- 130Matea Gold & Tom Hamburger, California Donor Disclosure Case Exposes How Nonprofit Groups Can Play in Politics, Wash. Post (Nov. 4, 2013), https://perma.cc/25D5-SX2V.
- 131See Nicholas Confessore, Group Linked to Kochs Admits to Campaign Finance Violations, N.Y. Times (Oct. 24, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/25/us/politics/group-linked-to-kochs-admits-to-campaign-finance-violations.html.
- 132Gold & Hamburger, supra note 130.
- 133W. Tradition P’ship, 271 P.3d at 7.
- 134Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 361–62 (2010).
- 135See, e.g., 1A Auto, Inc. v. Dir. of Off. of Campaign & Pol. Fin., 105 N.E.3d 1175, 1183 (Mass. 2018).
- 136See, e.g., United States v. Danielczyk, 683 F.3d 611, 618 (4th Cir. 2012); Ognibene v. Parkes, 671 F.3d 174, 195 n.21 (2d Cir. 2011); Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, 645 F.3d 1109, 1125 (9th Cir. 2011).
- 137See supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text.
- 138FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 208 (1982).
- 139FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 154–55 (2003).
- 140558 U.S. at 354, 356.
- 141Id. at 362 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978)).
- 142McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 197–98 (2014) (citing and quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25, 26–27, 29 (1976)).
- 143See 1A Auto, Inc. v. Dir. of Off. of Campaign & Pol. Fin., 105 N.E.3d 1188 (Mass. 2018).
- 144Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, 645 F.3d 1109, 1125 (9th Cir. 2011).
- 145Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 370–71 (2010) (internal citations omitted).
- 146See Center for Political Accountability, 2023 CPA-Zicklin Index of Corporate Political Disclosure and Accountability (Oct. 31, 2023), https://perma.cc/F789-7WUW (study of campaign spending practices of companies in S&P 500 Index and the Russell 1000 Index).
- 147Id. at 14 (78% of the Russell 1000 companies not in the S&P 500 provided no disclosure of their donations to state and local candidates and parties). See also Sarah C. Haan, Shareholder Proposal Settlements and the Private Ordering of Public Elections, 126 Yale L. J. 262 (2016).
- 148See Haan, supra note 147, at 303–04 (discussing the limited and “highly fragmented” nature of corporate political disclosure).
- 149See 2023 CPA-Zicklin Index, supra note 146, at 37, 39 (giving highest score to companies that report semiannually and partial positive score to companies that report annually). See also id. (giving full credit to companies that provide their political disclosures on an easily accessible dedicated webpage and partial credit to a company that “has a dedicated political webpage [that] is somewhat difficult to find”).
- 150See, e.g., Investment Company Institute, Majority of American Households Rely on Mutual Funds to Save and Invest (Nov. 1, 2023), https://perma.cc/CBF4-L5XE.
- 151Shareholder Proposal Submitted by Home Depot to NorthStar Asset Management Funded Pension Plan, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (Mar. 25, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2011/northstarasset032511-14a8.pdf.
- 152See Thomas W. Joo, Corporate Governance and the Constitutionality of Campaign Finance Reform, 1 Election L. J. 361, 367–68 (2002).
- 153McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185 (2014).
- 154Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 38 (1976).
- 155McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 200–03.
- 156Id. at 203–18.
- 157Id. at 221–23.
- 158Id. at 221.
- 159Id. (citations omitted).
- 160McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 199.
- 161Id.
- 162Id. at 223–27.
- 163Id. at 206–07.
- 164Id. at 223.
- 165FEC v. Cruz, 596 U.S. 289 (2022).
- 166Id. at 314.
- 167Id. at 305.
- 168Id. at 302–05.
- 169Id. at 305 (citations omitted).
- 170Id. at 306.
- 171Cruz, 596 U.S. at 306.
- 172Id. at 311. The dissent argued that the government and amici had presented ample evidence of such corruption. Id. at 323–27.
- 173Id. at 308–13.
- 174Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 594 U.S. 595 (2021).
- 175Id.at 600-02.
- 176Id. at 607.
- 177Id.
- 178Id. at 608–11
- 179Id. at 611–19
- 180Id. at 618.
- 181Id. at 607.
- 182Id. at 609.
- 183See Craig Holman & Kyung Rok Wi, Pay-to-Play Restrictions on Campaign Contributions from Government Contractors, 2016, Public Citizen, https://perma.cc/7PW3-TFLR.
- 184Wagner v. FEC, 793 F.3d 1 (D.C. 2015), cert. den. sub nom. Miller v. FEC, 577 U.S. 1102 (2016).
- 185Id. at 8.
- 186Id. at 14–21.
- 187Id. at 22.
- 188Id.
- 189See, e.g., Yamada v. Snipes, 786 F.3d 1182, 1204–07 (9th Cir. 2015); Ognibene v. Parkes, 671 F.3d 174, 182–93 (2d Cir. 2011); Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 616 F.3d 189, 199–205 (2d Cir. 2010).
- 190See Dallman v. Ritter, 225 P.3d 610 (Colo. 2010).
- 191See, e.g., Green Party of Conn., 616 F.3d; Yamada, 786 F.3d.
- 192Green Party of Conn., 616 F.3d at 194 (Connecticut contractor contribution ban applies to any “person, business entity or nonprofit corporation that enters into a state contract”); Yamada, 786 F.3d at 1204 (Hawaii contractor contribution ban applies to “any person” who enters into a contract with the state or other specified governmental entities).
- 19359 Fed. Reg. 17621 (Apr. 13, 1994). The rule has an exemption permitting a contribution of up to $250 to any official for whom the donor is eligible to vote. Id.
- 194See 81 Fed. Reg. 60053/1, 60057/2 (placement agents) 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)95(a)(i) (investment advisers). The rules permit a contribution of $350 to a candidate for whom the donor is eligible to vote, and a $150 contribution to other candidates.
- 19561 F.3d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
- 196Id. at 944–45.
- 197Id. at 947.
- 198Id. at 947–48.
- 199927 F.3d 499 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
- 200Id. at 510–11.
- 201Schiller Park Colonial Inn, Inc. v. Benz, 349 N.E.2d 611 (Ill. 1976).
- 202See, e.g., Casino Ass’n of La. v. Foster, 820 So.2d 494 (La. 2002); Soto v. N.J., 565 A.2d 1088 (N.J. 1989). But see Deon v. Barasch, 960 F.3d 152 (3d Cir. 2020) (finding not closely drawn a Pennsylvania law preventing individuals holding interests in businesses with gaming licenses from making political contributions).
- 203Ball v. Madigan, 245 F.Supp.3d 1004 (N.D. Ill 2017) (finding Illinois law banning medical cannabis cultivation centers and dispensers from making campaign contributions not closely drawn).
- 204See Gwinn v. State Ethics Comm’n, 426 S.E.2d 890 (Ga. 1993).
- 205See N.J. Bankers Ass’n v. Grewal, 2021 WL 2525762 (D.N.J. 2021).
- 206Compare Deon, 960 F.3d, with Casino Ass’n, 820 So.2d. See also Ball, 245 F.Supp.3d at 1016 (calling into question the 1976 Illinois Supreme Court decision in Schiller Park, 349 N.E.2d).
- 207State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597, 619 (Ak. 1999). Accord Preston v. Leake, 660 F.3d 726, 737 (4th Cir. 2011); Schickel v. Dilger, 925 F.3d 858, 871 (6th Cir. 2019) (“history confirms that contributions from lobbyists, their employers, and PACs as well as gifts from lobbyists, suggest quid pro quo corruption”). Accord Inst. of Governmental Advocs. v. Fair Pol. Pracs. Comm’n, 164 F.Supp.2d 1183, 1194 (E.D. Cal. 2001) (lobbyists’ contributions present a special danger of corruption because their “continued employment depends on their success in influencing legislative action”).
- 208Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 616 F.3d 189, 206 (2010). But cf Ognibene v. Parkes, 671 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2011) (upholding New York City law sharply lowering the permissible limit on contributions by lobbyists as part of broader restriction on contributions to city officials by persons doing business with the city).
- 209But cf. Blount v. SEC, 61 F.3d 938, 944–48 (MSRB Rule 37-G survives strict scrutiny). Subsequently, in N.Y. State Republican State Comm. v SEC, the D.C. Circuit applied the less exacting “closely drawn” standard instead of strict scrutiny. 927 F.3d at 511–12.
- 210558 U.S. 310, 362 (2010).
- 211565 U.S. 1104 (2012).
- 212Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281 (2011).
- 213The Federal Election Campaign Act prohibits a “foreign national” from directly making a contribution in connection with a federal, state, or local election. 52 U.S.C. § 30121(a). The Act’s definition of a “foreign national’ includes an individual who is not a citizen of the United States and a “foreign principal” which, in turn, includes a corporation “organized under the laws or having its principal place of business in a foreign country.” 52 U.S.C. § 30121(b). See also 11 C.F.R. § 110.20(a)(3).
- 214See 11 C.F.R. § 110.20(i). This provision also bars foreign nationals from “involvement in the management of a political committee.” See FEC, Contribution Limits and Prohibitions, 67 Fed. Reg. 69928, 69946 (Nov. 19, 2002). See generally, Ellen L. Weintraub, Draft Interpretive Rule Concerning Prohibited Activities Involving Foreign Nationals, Federal Election Commission (Sept. 26, 2019), https://perma.cc/H8LQ-YGUL.
- 215See, e.g., Jason Abel, Adie J. Olson & Elizabeth Goodwin, Growing List of States and Localities Prohibit Foreign Political Spending, Steptoe (Jan. 5, 2024), https://perma.cc/7Z9Z-QHHD; Ki Hong & Sam Rothbloom, States and Localities Take on Foreign-Influenced Political Spending, Reuters (May 30, 2023), https://www.reuters.com/legal/legalindustry/states-localities-take-foreign-influenced-political-spending-2023-05-30/.
- 216See, e.g., Greg Scruggs, Seattle Passes Campaign Finance Curbs on ‘Foreign-Influenced’ Firms, Reuters (Jan. 13, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-politics-seattle/seattle-passes-campaign-finance-curbs-on-foreign-influenced-firms-idUSKBN1ZD04T/ (“The Seattle City Council voted unanimously on Monday to approve campaign finance legislation banning political donations in local elections from companies with at least 5% foreign ownership.”); San Jose Bans City Election Contributions from Multinational Corporations, Ojai Valley News, (Dec. 13, 2023), https://perma.cc/7LPE-4N8B (“The new city legislation will prohibit corporations from spending money in San Jose’s elections if they are foreign-influenced, defined as 1 percent or more ownership by a single foreign investor or five percent or more ownership by multiple foreign investors.”).
- 217Minn. Stat. § 211B.15
- 218Minn. Chamber of Com. v. Choi, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2023 WL 8803357 (D. Minn. Dec. 20, 2023).
- 219Id. at *7.
- 220Central Me. Power Co. v. Me. Comm’n on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2024 WL 866367 (D. Me. Feb. 29, 2024).
- 221Id. at *2.
- 222Id. at *12. The court assumed without deciding that limiting foreign government interest in referendum elections is also a compelling government interest. Id. The court also found that FECA preempted the application of the state law to federal elections but that it did not prohibit state regulation of foreign government campaign expenditures in state and local candidate elections or referenda. Id. at *5–11.
- 223Id. at *13–14. The court left open the possibility that during discovery the state could provide evidence of foreign government influence over campaign spending by domestic entities with only a small ownership share. Id. at *14.
- 224Id. at *15. The court had found the ban on foreign government campaign participation narrowly tailored to the state’s interest, id. at *13, but concluded that at least at the preliminary injunction stage that provision could not be severed from the rest of the law. Id. at *16.
- 225558 U.S. 310, 371 (2010).
- 226See supra notes 145–52 and accompanying text.
- 227See supra notes 146–47 and accompanying text.
- 228See Haan, supra note 147.
- 229Letter from Commission on Disclosure of Corporate Political Spending to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (Aug. 3, 2011), https://perma.cc/4QL8-P8P6.
- 230Bebchuk et al., The Untenable Case for Keeping Investors in the Dark, 10 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 1, 3 (2020).
- 231Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023, Pub. L. No. 117-328, § 633, 136 Stat. 4459, 4703 (2022). The same wording was included in the 2017 and 2018 versions of the Act. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-31, § 635, 131 Stat. 135, 376 (2017); Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141, § 631, 132 Stat. 348, 584 (2018). The 2016 version had slightly different wording. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 707, 129 Stat. 2242, 3029-3030 (2015) (“None of the funds made available by any division of this Act shall be used by the Securities and Exchange Commission to finalize, issue, or implement any rule, regulation, or order regarding the disclosure of political contributions, contributions to tax exempt organizations, or dues paid to trade associations.”).
- 232558 U.S. 310, 366–71 (2010).
- 233See supra notes 174–82 and accompanying text.
- 234Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 354, 356 (2010).
- 235See id. at 337–38.
- 236See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
- 237In addition to McCutcheon and Cruz, discussed in the text, the only other campaign finance decided by the Court in the last fourteen years is Thompson v. Hebdon, 589 U.S. 1 (2019), a brief per curiam decision vacating and remanding a Ninth Circuit decision affirming a lower court’s dismissal of Alaska’s contribution limits. The case broke no new ground, finding only that the lower courts had failed to adequately consider the Court’s earlier decision in Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006), in assessing the Alaska contribution limits.