Generative artificial intelligence is being rapidly deployed for corporate tasks including pricing. Suppose one of these machines communicates with the pricing manager of a competing firm, proposes to collude, receives assent, and raises price. Is this a crime under U.S. antitrust laws, and, if so, who is liable?
Major competition regulators, and substantial portions of the scholarly community, have rapidly adopted the view that “killer acquisitions” and “kill zones” constitute significant sources of competitive risk arising from incumbent acquisitions of emerging firms in digital markets. Based on this view, policymakers in the United States, European Union, and other jurisdictions have advocated for, and in some cases have taken, substantial changes to merger review policies that would erect significant obstacles to incumbent/startup acquisitions.
Company insiders will typically be in possession of material non-public information (MNPI) about their companies. In order to allow insiders the opportunity to trade, the SEC adopted Rule 10b5-1, which provides an affirmative defense to insider trading liability if the trades are made pursuant to a written plan or trading instruction entered into when the trader was not aware of MNPI.
Because prudent corporate governance often requires managers to take risks based on statistically expected outcomes, corporate failures that have a small but finite chance of occurring cannot always be prevented. This Article makes three related claims about risk-taking in corporate governance.
On the heels of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in West Virginia v. Environmental Protection Agency, the “major questions” doctrine quickly came to be perceived as a significant impediment to the finalization of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s proposed rule on climate-related disclosures.
