Print Archive | The University of Chicago Business Law Review

Article

Volume 1.1

Endogenous Choice of Stakes Under Common Ownership

C. Scott Hemphill

Moses H. Grossman Professor of Law, New York University School of Law

We thank Chris Conlon, Angel Lopez, Alessio Piccolo, and participants at the NYU Law and Economics Workshop and the NBIM Common Ownership Mini-Conference for helpful comments.

Marcel Kahan

George T. Lowy Professor of Law, New York University School of Law

We thank Chris Conlon, Angel Lopez, Alessio Piccolo, and participants at the NYU Law and Economics Workshop and the NBIM Common Ownership Mini-Conference for helpful comments.

I. Introduction

A common concentrated owner (CCO) holds stakes in competing firms.2

Article

Volume 1.1

Should There Be Corporate Governance Police?

M. Todd Henderson

Michael J. Marks Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School

I. Introduction

Article

Volume 1.1

Shadow Contracts

Jessica S. Jeffers

Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Finance and David G. Booth Faculty Fellow, Booth School of Business, University of Chicago

We are grateful to collaboration of Eighteen East Capital partners, Dave Portmann and Thomas Venon, Swedish International Development Agency, Global Affairs Canada, the Impact Finance Research Consortium, the Wharton Social Impact Initiative, and the Rustandy Center, in particular fellows, and participant fund general partners, for making this paper possible. Jim Hicks & Hanson Ho provided excellent research assistance; all errors are our own.

Anne M. Tucker

Anne M. Tucker, Professor & Faculty Director of Legal Analytics & Innovation, Georgia State University College of Law

I. Introduction

Article

Volume 1.1

The Win-Win That Wasn’t: Managing to the Stock Market’s Negative Effects on American Workers and Other Corporate Stakeholders

Aneil Kovvali

Harry A. Bigelow Teaching Fellow & Lecturer in Law, University of Chicago Law School

The authors are grateful for the incisive comments of Matthew Bodie, Miguel Padro and David Berger, and the help of Peggy Pfeiffer.

Leo E. Strine, Jr.

Michael L. Wachter Distinguished Fellow at the University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School; Senior Fellow, Harvard Program on Corporate Governance; Of Counsel, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz; former Chief Justice and Chancellor, the State of Delaware

The authors are grateful for the incisive comments of Matthew Bodie, Miguel Padro and David Berger, and the help of Peggy Pfeiffer.

I. Introduction

Article

Volume 1.1

Not-for-Profits, ESGs, and The Economic Structure of Corporate Law

Saul Levmore

I. Introduction

Article

Volume 1.1

Insider Trading: Easterbrook and Fischel and Easterbrook vs. Fischel

Jonathan R. Macey

Sam Harris Professor of Corporate Law, Corporate Finance and Securities Law, Yale Law School

The author is grateful to Joshua Macey for his valuable comments.

Introduction

Coauthoring can be a tricky business. This is particularly true where the coauthors already have staked out strong and distinct positions on a highly salient subject such as insider trading.

Article

Volume 1.1

Easterbrook and Fischel on Corporate Purpose

Edward B. Rock

Martin Lipton Professor of Law and co-director of the Institute for Corporate Governance and Finance, NYU School of Law, and Research Fellow at the European Corporate Governance Institute

I. Introduction

Article

Volume 1.1

Pills in a World of Activism and ESG

Caley Petrucci

Climenko Fellow & Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law School

Comments welcome at cpetrucci@law.harvard.edu

Guhan Subramanian

Joseph Flom Professor of Law & Business, Harvard Law School; Douglas Weaver Professor of Business Law, Harvard Business School; Faculty Chair, Harvard Law School Program on Negotiation; Faculty Chair, Harvard Business School Mergers & Acquisitions Executive Education Program; Chairman of the Board of Directors, LKQ Corp. (NASDAQ: LKQ)

Professor Subramanian served as an expert witness for The Williams Companies and Versum Materials, Inc. in the poison pill litigation that is discussed in the text. We thank participants at the University of Chicago Business Law Review Symposium and the Harvard JD/MBA Seminar for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts. We also thank Marc Schwab for his excellent research assistance.

I. Introduction

Comment

Volume 1.1

Who Can Tax Telecommuters?: A Case for an Economic Presence Regime

Garry Canepa

J.D. 2022, The University of Chicago Law School

Many thanks to Professor Julie Roin for her useful feedback and rigorous criticisms, making any faults in reasoning my own. Thanks to The University of Chicago Business Law Review editors for their extensive comments and edits.